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The Emergency Electric Power Supply Systems at Pressurized 
Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants are reviewed, problem 
areas are identified, and recommendations are made for 
existing and future Nuclear Power Plants. 
A simplified introduction to a typical Pressurized Water 
Nuclear Reactor is given and the problems associated with 
the commercial use of nuclear power are discussed. An 
overview of the Nuclear industry's solutions is presented 
and covers the Reliability of equipment and the American 
Regulatory requirements. 
The alternating and direct current power supply systems 
are examined in terms of plant operational state and 
equipment type (Diesel generators, Grid network, Lead-acid 
batteries, Battery chargers, Inverters, and Power 
Distribution networks). 
The trends in the design of Emergency Electric Power 
supply systems at Nuclear Power Plants are presented. The 
loss of all alternating current power, known as Station 
Blackout, is discussed and the American and European 
response to this. problem is presented. Problems 
experienced in the direct current systems are discussed 
and solutions are presented. The experience at Koeberg 
Nuclear Power station with Lead-acid batteries is included 
in the discussion. 
The thesis concludes with recommendations for designers 
and operators of the Electric Power Supply Systems at 
Nuclear Power Stations. 
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1. Introduction 
Nuclear Power stations need heat removal systems that are 
very reliable. An excessive build-up of heat .in the 
Reactor Core can eventually lead to a large release of 
radio-active material into the environment. The source of 
the heat is the radio-active decay of the Nuclear fuel. 
This is a significant portion of the energy output of a 
Nuclear Reactor. A Nuclear Power Plant without heat 
removal systems will experi~nce Reactor Core damage within 
hours. 
The electric power systems at Nuclear Power Plants are the 
main source of energy for the heat removal systems, and 
therefore need to be very r.eliable. Conventional coal-
fired Power Stations also utilize Emergency power supplies 
to protect equipment, but these systems have an added 
importance at Nuclear Power Stations. 
The principle function of the Emergency Power Supplies at 
a Nuclear Power Station is to provide power for the 
Engineered Safety Features. These are systems specifically 
designed to remove heat from the Reactor Core, and to 
minimize the impact to the environment of any Nuclear 
accident. 
Typically, the principle sources of Emergency electric 
power are two Diesel Generators which can each deliver 5 
Megawatts or more of electric power. Supplementary power 
for Control & Instrumentation systems is provided by Lead-
acid batteries, in all some 400 kilowatts of direct 
current loads can be powered for one hour. The complexity 
of the electrical network can be gauged from the number of 
electric cables in a typical Nuclear Power Plant - there 
are over 40 000 cables with a total length of several 
hundred kilometers. 
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The Emergency Electric Power supply systems at a Nuclear 
Power Plants require a considerable amount of Engineering 
input and the equipment represents a significant part 
(RlOO million+) of the overall plant cost. 
2 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to review the Emergency 
Electric Power Supply systems at Pressurized Water-Reactor 
Nuclear Power Plants, to identify problem areas, and to 
make recommendations for existing and future Nuclear Power 
Plants. 
The author has limited the scope of the 
Pressurized Water Reactors' (PWR's) as the 
thesis to 
trend today 
appears to be toward the use of PWR' s ( 1] and as the 
author's experience has · been confined to PWR' s. 
Nevertheless, much of this thesis is applicable to Boiling 
Water Reactor Plants as the Electric Power Supply systems 
are similar to those on Pressurized Water Reactor Plants. 
1. The British have chosen a Pressurized Water Reactor of American design for their new 
Nuclear Power Stations even though Britain has developed its own Boiling Water Reactors. 
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1.2 Background 
The author has been working in the Technical Support 
section at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station for the past 
three-and-a-half years. During that time he was trained in 
France by the French Contractor on the design and 
installation of the Electric power systems at Koeberg 
Nuclear Power Station. The emphasis was on the alternating 
current systems. 
The author has had extensive "Contact with operating and 
design problems at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. 
Solutions were developed which involved knowledge of the 
plant equipment, International and Local Specifications, 
and Nuclear Regulatory requirements. 
A review of the literature showed that there were very few 
papers written about the electric systems on Nuclear Power 
Plants and all were on specific topics in the field. The 
need for a document which provided both the specialist 
engineer and the non-specialist manager with a complete, 
up-to-date information package was evident. This thesis 
therefore contains a comprehensive introduction to Nuclear 
Power Plant and the electric systems in particular, as 
well as the latest information on the design of the 
electric power systems in Europe and America. 
The thesis is therefore useful as a training document for 
Engineers who wish to become familiar with Nuclear plant 
and the design of the electrical systems. At Koeberg 
Nuclear Power Station, the document will be used to 
introduce new staff in the Technical Support section to 
the electrical power systems of Nuclear Power stations. 
The author has been personally responsible for 
investigations and evaluations of the direct current power 
systems at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, and has been 
used as a technical advisor in the 'Station Blackout' 
4 
investigations at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. The 
author has utilized his experience at Koeberg Nuclear 
Power station to identify problem areas and to formulate 
the recommendations for future power stations which are 
put forward in this thesis. 
The thesis will therefore be of use to ESKOM's corporate 
Nuclear Groups who will be responsible for the purchase of 
the next Nuclear Power station in South Africa. 
The information base of th~s thesis consists of the 
author's experience at Koeberg Nuclear Power station, a 
comprehensive literature search using the INSPEC index of 
abstracts going back to 1978, the documentation at Koeberg 
Nuclear Power station, and informal contacts with experts 
both inside and out of ESKOM. 
The research on which this thesis is based was carried out 
between July 1986 and July 1989. 
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1.3 summary of contents 
A summary of each chapter is now given. 
The thesis contains six chapters, the first being this 
introduction. 
The second chapter provides the electrical engineer with a 
simplified introduction to a typical Pressurized Water 
Nuclear Reactor and covers ;the mechanical equipment used 
to generate electric power from Uranium fuel. Simplified 
flow diagrams and descriptions of the major systems in a 
typical Pressurized Water Reactor are given. The hazards 
associated with the use of Nuclear power for generating 
electricity are discussed and the Nuclear industry's 
solutions are presented. 
The third chapter provides an overview of the special 
requirements for Nuclear Power Plants. The main topic of 
this chapter is the Reliability of equipment and systems. 
The American Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements 
for commercial nuclear reactors are also presented. 
The fourth chapter describes the electric power systems of 
a Nuclear plant in detail. The different operating modes 
of the plant are examined and the loads that need power 
are identified. The power system configuration required to 
power these loads is described, both the alternating 
current and direct current systems. The principle 
Emergency alternating current sources are the Standby 
Diesel Generator sets, while the main direct current 
Emergency power sources are Lead-acid Batteries. The 
Emergency Electric Power Distribution network is also 
discussed. 
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The fifth chapter identifies trends in the design of 
electric power systems in Nuclear Power Plants. The 
increasing use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment for 
justifying the use of Nuclear power is discussed. -Current 
topics in Europe and America are the loss of all 
Alternating current , known as Station Blackout, and the 
reliability of the equipment used in the direct current 
power systems. In this thesis the Alternating Power trends 
are discussed by country, and the direct current power 
systems by equipment type. 
The sixth chapter summarizes the problem areas, and 
presents a series of recommendations for present and 
future Nuclear Power Plants. .A Nuclear Power Plant is a 
large capital investment and any improvement in the 
operation of the plant could result in big savings:- one 
way to effect improvements is by using the experience of 
other Nuclear Power Plant operators. This thesis therefore 
concludes with recommendations for existing power plants, 
and recommendations for plants that are about to be built. 
The thesis is intended to be a complete document that can 
be used to inform non-specialist professionals and 
managers of the current issues in the design of the 
electric power systems at Nuclear Power Plants. These 
readers are invited to read the complete thesis. 
Managers and professionals involved with Nuclear Power 
Plants should review Chapters 3 & 4, and concentrate on 
Chapters 5 & 6. The recommendations of Chapter 6 are 
addressed to managers 
responsible for operating 
and professionals who 
existing plants, or who 




2. An Introduction to Nuclear Power Plant 
A Nuclear Power station produces electricity in the same 
way as a power station that uses coal: - that . is, by 
consuming a fuel to heat water to steam, which drives a 
steam turbine and produces electric power via a generator. 
However, a Nuclear Power Station is more complex because 
the fuel used is Uranium, and the phenomena of Nuclear 
Fission is used to release the energy from the Uranium. 
In this chapter, the Nuclear Fission process is described, 
and a simplified introduction to a Pressurized Water 
Reactor Nuclear Power Plant is given. The principle 
components of the Nuclear Reactor are presented, and the 
manner in which the Nuclear Fission process is controlled 
is discussed. The main Secondary systems, that is, the 
Steam Turbine and Electric Generator, are described 
briefly. 
The equipment and systems provided to prevent the release 
of radio-active material to the environment are examined. 
These systems are collectively known as the Engineered 
Safety Features and are designed to cope with the worst 
postulated Nuclear accident. 
2.1 The Nuclear Fission Process 
Nuclear fission in Uranium occurs when a neutron collides 
with a nucleus of a Uranium atom and splits it into two 
segments called Fission Products. The result is the 
release of energy and two more neutrons. The process of 
Nuclear Fission can be made self-sustaining if one of the 
neutrons released causes another Uranium atom to undergo 
Nuclear Fission, and so on. The amount of energy released 
for a given mass of fuel is far greater in the Nuclear 
Fission process than that produced by burning an organic 
fuel in oxygen. 
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The Fission Products of the split Uranium atom are highly 
radio-active isotopes. A radio-active isotope has a 'half 
life', that is, the radioactivity diminishes exponentially 
at a rate that is unique to each isotope. The . Fission 
Products of the Uranium fission process release 
significant amounts of energy for many years. This energy 
is in the form of gamma rays and various other particle 
emissions which are all dangerous to human life. This is 
therefore the prime reason why Nuclear Power Stations 
need such reliable equipment'. 
In commercial reactors of the type used at Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Station, the thermal power output of the reactor 
drops to some 6% of the full load power immediately after 
the reactor fission process is. shut down [2]. This thermal 
power comes from the radio-active decay energy of the 
Fission Products in the reactor core. The energy released 
reduces as the Fission Products decay, but it takes years 
before the thermal power drops to a safe level:- after one 
month the decay energy is still O .1% of the full load 
power. 
It is therefore essential that heat removal systems are 
available to transport the heat away from the fuel 
elements. If the Fission Product decay heat is not 
removed, then the fuel elements will overheat and the 
reactor will be damaged. Then there is also the 
possibility that the radio-active Fission Products could 
be released to the environment with disastrous results. 
As an example of the hazards posed by the release of 
radio-active Fission Products from a Nuclear Power Plant, 
at Chernobyl [ 3], some 2. 5% of the core material was 
released to the countryside. Fortunately the initial large 
release missed the nearby town of Pripyat but the 
2 • Westinghouse Training manual "PLANT SYSTEMS ENGINEER", prepared for ESKC:»4, 1985, Chap.RT· 
3, page 39. 
3. "CHERNOBYL: THE SOVIET REPORT," Nuclear News, October 1986, pages 59 to 66. 
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surrounding forests were heavily contaminated. Now, even 
after massive clean-up efforts, all the land up to 30km 
away from the site remains uninhabitable, and over the 
next 70 years the soviets estimate that 2% more people 
will die from cancer:- that is about 300 people more than 
the estimated 14 000 that will develop cancer 
spontaneously. Two hundred and three people involved in 
the accident were hospitalized with acute radiation 
sickness and will either die or partially recover. 
Thus, we can see why there is so much more risk associated 
with using Nuclear power: - in a coal fired boiler, the 
flames are extinguished immediately when the coal and air 
are shut off from the furnace and no more energy is 
produced. But the decay heat . in a Nuclear plant must be 
removed even after the Fission process has been stopped. 
The need for highly reliable heat transport systems at 
Nuclear Power Plants is obvious and the backbone of any 
heat transport system is electricity:- that is, power to 
drive pumps, open valves, and operate equipment that 
monitors and controls the reactor. 
However, before we can discuss the electric power 
requirements of a Nuclear Power Station, we must first 
understand how it operates and what it consists of. 
2.2 The Nuclear Reactor. 
The heart of a commercial Pressurized Water Nuclear 
Reactor is the Primary Coolant Loop. Figure 2.1 shows a 
simplified diagram of the Primary Coolant Loop:- the 
reactor vessel contains sealed fuel rods with Uranium 
dioxide ceramic pellets inside. A reactor coolant pump 
forces Primary Coolant water past the fuel rods and the 
water is heated by the energy released by the Fission 
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"Pressurized Water Reactor Primary Coolant 
Loop" 
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then passes through a large heat exchanger known as a 
Steam generator. 
There is no steam produced by the fuel rods and the energy 
is transferred from the reactor by water that is highly 
pressurized to keep it from boiling - hence the name of 
the Pressurized Water Reactor. Thus the Primary Coolant 
water absorbs energy from the fuel rods in the reactor and 
heats up. In the Steam Generators, the Primary Coolant 
transfers the energy to_ thi:! Secondary Feedwater and the 
Primary Coolant water therefore cools down again. 
The device used to keep the water so highly pressurized 
(at about 150 Bar) is called the Pressurizer. It works by 
using the natural phenomenon that if steam is pressurized 
enough, it will turn to water - with a corresponding drop 
in volume. So the Pressurizer has Electric heaters which 
boil the water in it to form a steam bubble. The steam 
bubble is the feature that controls the Primary System 
pressure and it works as follows: - should the Primary 
System volume increase, then some of the steam condenses 
to water and reduces the volume of the Steam Bubble. The 
over-all system pressure is therefore maintained because 
steam volume change compensates for the increase in water 
volume. And conversely, should the Primary volume 
decrease, then some of the Pressurizer water vaporizes to 
steam with an increase in volume, and the system pressure 
is maintained. This mechanism cannot cope with extreme 
changes in pressure, so the mean system pressure is 
controlled by using heaters and cooling spray water to 
expand and reduce the Steam Bubble in the Pressurizer. 
The final control of the Primary Coolant system is the 
Pressurizer Relief Valves:- these are simply safety valves 
that vent the Primary Coolant water to prevent the Primary 
Coolant pressure from exceeding the system design limits. 
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The Secondary feedwater comes from the Turbine steam 
Condenser and is pumped into the Secondary side of the 
steam generators using Feedwater pumps. The resulting 
steam is used to drive the Steam Turbine which rotates the 
Electric Generator. The steam leaving the Turbine is 
condensed to water in the Turbine Steam Condenser and the 
Feedwater cycle continues as described previously. 
An interesting point is 
a Ship's propeller and 
that the historical 
that the Steam Turbine could drive 
~ t ·is, in fact, for this reason 
forerunner of the commercial 
Pressurized Water Reactor was developed:- a Pressurized 
Water Reactor plant can be made very compact for use in 
ships and submarines. 
An important feature is that the Primary Coolant water is 
physically separated from the Secondary Feedwater in the 
Steam Generators:- therefore, any radio-active Fission 
Products leaking from a damaged fuel rod will be contained 
in the Primary System. 
2.3 Controlling the Nuclear Fission Process 
It is important that the Nuclear Fission process is 
maintained and controlled. As we saw earlier, each Fission 
event results in the release of Fission Products, two 
neutrons and energy. In order for further Nuclear fission 
reactions to occur, other Uranium atoms must be 
sufficiently close by. In fact, for every combination of 
Uranium fuel elements and heat transfer medium, there is a 
Critical Mass, that is, there has to be a certain density 
of Uranium atoms in an area before the Fission process is 
self-sustaining. 
A typical Pressurized Water Reactor has fuel rods spaced 
roughly 1. 5 cm apart and uses Borated water as a heat 
transfer medium. The Boron atoms in the water are used to 
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absorb neutrons and by varying this concentration, we can 
regulate the number of neutrons (produced by Fission 
reactions) that go on to cause further reactions. Thus by 
controlling the number of neutrons moving about. in the 
reactor, we can control the Nuclear fission process. 
2.3.1 The Chemical & Volumetric Control System 
One of the major plant syst~ms for controlling the neutron 
density in the reactor is -the Reactor Chemical and 
Volumetric Control system:- a schematic of this system is 
shown in Figure 2. 2. The one function is to regulate to 
Boron concentration in the Primary Coolant System. This is 
achieved by continuously drawing off water from the 
Primary Coolant system and either diluting it with water, 
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The other function of the Reactor Chemical and Volumetric 
Control 
Coolant 
system is to regulate the volume 
in the Primary coolant system. As 
of Reactor 
the Primary 
Coolant water heats up to the operating temperature (about 
320 deg.C) it expands:- the Reactor Chemical and 
Volumetric Control system maintains the Primary Coolant 
volume by drawing water out of the Primary system while 
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"The Chemical & Volumetric Control System" 
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2.3.2 The Control Rods 
The control afforded by the Chemical and Volume Control 
system is not able to cope with rapid changes . in the 
Nuclear fission process. Therefore, a number of Control 
Rods are provided to control the Reactor during any rapid 
transients that may occur. These are metal rods containing 
atoms such as Silver and Indium, that are very good 
neutron absorbers. The rods move into the reactor from 
above in special channel~ and have complex driving 
mechanisms that can position groups of rods at any 
distance into the reactor. The rods can be moved rapidly 
and provide "fine control" of the Reactor, the "rough 
control" being the Boron concentration in the Primary 
coolant. 
The Control Rod Drive Mechanisms drop the rods immediately 
on loss of power to the Rod Control system and the effect 
of all the Control Rods dropping into the reactor at once 
is to immediately stop all Nuclear fissions. Historically, 
this is known as a SCRAM from the words "Safety Control 
Axe Man":- in the early days of Nuclear research the 
Control rods were held out of the reactor by a rope over a 
pulley and the only safety system was a man with an axe 
who would chop through the rope if anything went wrong! 
Today the SCRAM function is fully automated and designed 
to be highly reliable. 
2.3.3 The Residual Heat Removal System 
The Reactor Chemical and Volumetric Control system and the 
Control Rods are used to control the reactor during power 
operation and the energy produced in the reactor core is 
transferred to the Steam Generators and eventually leaves 
the plant as electric energy. However, when the Reactor 
and Generator are shut down, the decay heat is removed by 
the Residual Heat Removal System 
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The Residual Heat Removal System is shown schematically in 
Figure 2.3 and consists of two pumps which circulate the 
Primary Coolant through two heat exchangers. The heat 
exchangers are cooled by a closed loop cooling system -
the Component Cooling System - which transfers the heat to 
the Ultimate Heatsink (often the sea). The principle of 
using multiple barriers against radio-active material 
release is used here as well - the Primary coolant could 
possibly leak into the Component Cooling System, but it 
would be detected here l~ng'before it could escape to the 
environment. 
The above systems are essentially all that is needed to 
control the Reactor during Normal operation. We shall see 
later that further special systems are provided to cope 
with any accidents that may occur. Having explored the 
Primary Coolant system, we shall now go on to discuss the 











"The Residual Heat Removal System" 
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2.4 The Steam Turbine 
The Steam Turbine is driven by the steam produced in the 
Steam Generator and provides the mechanical power to drive 
the Generator. Figure 2. 4 shows a typical Westinghouse 
Steam Turbine layout. The Steam Turbine is divided into 
various stages to make the best use of the steam's energy. 
A High Pressure stage is optimized for the steam produced 
by the Steam Generators and the Low Pressure stage is 
optimized for the steam ~hat exits from the High Pressure 
stage. The Low Pressure stage typically consists of two or 
three Low Pressure steam turbines in parallel. 
In plants of Westinghouse design, the steam that exits 
from the High Pressure stag~ is reheated in Moisture 
Separator Reheaters before being passed through the Low 
Pressure stage. The heating medium for the Moisture 
Separator Reheaters is steam tapped of just before the 
High Pressure stage. 
The steam that exits from the Low Pressure stage is 
condensed to water in a large heat exchanger known as a 
Condenser. The Condenser is cooled by water pumped from 
the Ultimate heatsink by the Circulating Water system. 
Water must be pumped into the steam Generators to replace 
that which is boiled off as steam. The Steam Turbine flow 
cycles are indicated in Figure 2.4:- Water, known as 
Condensate, is pumped by Condensate pumps from the bottom 
of the Condenser and passes through a couple of Low 
Pressure Heaters which heat the Condensate. Feedwater 
pumps then transform the low pressure Condensate into 
Feedwater which has sufficient pressure to overcome the 
Pressure inside the Steam Generators. The Feedwater is 
heated by High Pressure Feedwater heaters before it enters 
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The purpose of the Low and High Pressure heaters is to 
improve the overall thermodynamic efficiency of the 
Secondary cycle. They are simply heat exchangers which use 
steam bled from various stages of the steam turbine to 
heat the Feedwater. The steam condensed in the Feedwater 
heaters is recycled back into the Feedwater cycle, either 
back into the Condenser, or is injected into the 
Condensate circuit by large pumps. 
2.5 The Generator 
The Generator transforms the mechanical power produced by 
the Steam Turbine into electric power. This power flows 
into the Grid network and is .thus transported to the end 
users of the electric power. 
The Generator can be connected to the Grid network in a 
number of ways. One method is shown in Figure 2. 5: - the 
generator output passes through a Generator Circuit 
Breaker, the Generator Transformer, and then out to the 
network through a High Voltage Circuit Breaker. The Unit 
auxiliaries, that is, all the motors and other electric 
loads in the power station, are supplied through a Unit 
Transformer. 
Another method is similar but uses a motorized isolator in 
the place of the Generator Circuit Breaker. This is a 
cheaper alternative, but has one disadvantage: - if the 
Generator must be shutdown due to plant problem, the High 
Voltage breaker must be opened and so the supply to the 
Unit auxiliaries is lost. Thus, the advantage of the 
Generator Circuit Breaker over the motorized isolator, is 
that the Unit Auxiliaries are secure even when the 
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"Generator connection using Circuit 
Breaker" 
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Both these schemes have an advantage over the Scheme shown 
in Figure 2 . 6: - here the Unit Auxiliaries are supplied 
directly from the High Voltage network. The Unit 
Auxiliaries therefore remain secure in the event of a 
Generator shutdown, even if the High Voltage breaker has 
to be opened. However, the possibility of "House Loading" 
is lost. 
The expression "House Loading" is used to describe the 
supply of the Unit Auxiliciries by the Generator in the 
event of a loss of High Voltage power. Referring to Figure 
2.5, say a Grid fault causes the High Voltage breaker to 
open. Now, if the Generator and Reactor survive the 
transient without the automatic protection systems 
shutting them down, then the Unit Auxiliaries will be 
supplied by the Generator via the Unit Auxiliary 
Transformer. 
The opening of the High Voltage breaker while at 100% 
power is quite a severe transient on the power plant and 
it is difficult to retain control of the plant without 
exceeding plant safety limits. Once these limits are 
exceeded, the Reactor and Generator are immediately and 
automatically shutdown. A typical probability for house 
loading is 3 successful transfers out of 10 attempts. 
The Turbine and Generator have forced oil lubrication on 
all bearings. The oil is pumped into the bearings by an 
oil pump driven from the Turbine shaft, or by electric oil 
pumps. One of the electric oil pumps is powered by a de 
motor which has a battery backed supply to provide 
lubrication in the event of an ac power failure. 
A motor is provided to slowly rotate the Turbine shaft 
when the steam is shut off and the turbine is still hot:-
if the shaft is not kept turning, then it will not cool 
evenly and will bow. The uneven cooling is caused by the 













Figure 2.6 "Unit Auxiliaries - Direct supply from 
Network" 
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2.6 The Engineered Safety Features 
All the systems described previously are the main systems 
necessary for normal operation of a Nuclear Power Station. 
There are however, other important systems known as the 
Engineered Safety Features which have been specifically 
designed to prevent the release of radio-active material 
into the environment, even if a Nuclear accident should 
occur. 
2.6.1 Postulated Accidents 
The Engineered Safety Features are designed to cope with 
all probable accidents:- the two worst failures are-
1. The complete shearing of the largest pipe in the 
. ' Primary Coolant system, and 
2. The complete shearing of the main steam pipe from the 
Steam Generator. 
These accidents are known as the Design Base Accidents 
(DBA). The consequences of both accidents is that all the 
water in the ruptured system flashes over to steam. The 
loss of water in the Primary Coolant system results in the 
Reactor core being uncovered and the decay energy 
therefore causes temperature of the fuel rods to rise. If 
no cooling water is provided, the fuel rod cladding will 
eventually melt and allow the release of the radio-active 
Fission Products. 
The consequences of the Main Steam Line Break are that the 
Reactor undergoes a severe thermodynamic transient which 
may cause the Nuclear fission process to go out of 
control. 
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2.6.2 Multiple Fission Product Barriers 
We have already discussed elements of the first Engineered 
Safety Feature:- the use of multiple Fission .Product 
Barriers. The fuel rods contain a large amount of radio 
activity and some of it is in the form of radio-active 
gases such as Xenon, Krypton and Iodine which result from 
the various Nuclear reactions in the fuel rod. The fuel 
rods are sealed to prevent the release of the Fission 
Products and are therefor~ the First Fission Product 
Barrier. However, if the fuel~rods get damaged then some 
of the Fission Products will escape. The Primary Coolant 
system boundary is the Second Fission Product Barrier and 
will contain any Fission Products released from the fuel 
rods. Should the Primary Coolant system rupture, the 
Fission Products will be contained by the last Fission 
Product Barrier - the Reactor Containment building. 
It is interesting to note that at Chernobyl there was no 
Containment Isolation building and the large releases of 
radio-active material may have been reduced if one had 
been built. But the reactor type used at Chernobyl is of 
the Boiling Water Type and is much larger than the 
Pressurized Water type, so the cost of any containment 
building is significant. Even after Chernobyl, the Soviets 
maintain that there is no practical possibility of 
providing a Containment building of the Pressurized Water 
type at their Boiling Water reactors [4]. 
Thus three Fission Product Barriers exist on Pressurized 
Water Reactors. Commercial Nuclear Power Stations have 
Engineered Safety Feature systems 
specifically designed to maintain 
Barrier integrity under all 
conditions. These are:-
installed that are 
the Fission Product 
postulated accident 
4. "CHERNOBYL: THE SOVIET REPORT," Nuclear News, October 1986, pages 59 to 66. 
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2.6.3 The Containment Isolation System 
The Containment Isolation System consists of special 
valves in all pipes and ducts that penetrate the 
Containment Building. All these valves can be closed 
remotely, and when they are all closed, the design leak-
rate of the Containment building ( at 5 Bar air pressure 
and over 24 hours) is 0.3 percent of the air mass inside 
the building [5]. The Containment Building integrity is 
tested every 10 years to ch~ck it's ability to withstand a 
Design Base Accident. 
The worst Design Base Accident for the Containment 
building is the Main Steam Line Break:- the pressure 
inside the Containment reaches.a peak of 3.8 Bar. 
2.6.4 Containment Building Heat Removal systems 
Two systems are installed to remove post-accident heat 
from the Containment building. These systems also remove 
Fission Products from the Containment atmosphere. 
After a Design Base Accident the steam released causes the 
temperature and pressure inside the Containment building 
to rise. The energy in the steam is removed by the 
Containment Building Heat Removal systems and this limits 
the temperature to a maximum of about 17 o deg. C and the 
pressure to 3.8 Bar. If the Containment atmosphere is not 
cooled, then the steam pressure will build up and 
eventually rupture the Containment building. The first 
Containment Building Heat 
Containment Spray System. 
Removal system is the 
5. Electricite de France. "EDF 900 MWe NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, SHORT TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION." 
issued by Service d'Equipment Nucleaire Exterieur, 11·13 Avenue de Friedland, 75008 
PARIS, May 1983. 
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2.6.4.1 The Containment Spray System. 
A schematic of the Containment Spray System is shown in 
Figure 2.7. The containment atmosphere is cooled by water 
sprayers. The water is pumped from a large tank of Borated 
water known as the Refueling Water Storage Tank. The water 
and condensed steam is collected in sumps at the bottom of 
the Containment building and is re-cycled when the 
Refueling Water storage Tank runs dry. Heat exchangers 
cool the hot water from the sumps before it is re-sprayed. 
Radio-active iodine is released into the Containment 
atmosphere when the fuel rods are ruptured as Iodine is 
one of Uranium's Fission Products. If human beings are 
exposed to Iodine, the substance concentrates in the 
Thyroid Gland, and as the Iodine is radio-active, the 
person is irradiated from a source within the body. This 
is the reason that Potassium Iodide tablets are given out 
to the public near some Nuclear Reactors:- in the event of 
a release of radio-active Iodine, the public take these 
tablets which saturate their Thyroid Glands with Iodine, 
and the radio-active Iodine is not taken up. The Soviets 
used a youth organization to effect widespread 
distribution and use of Potassium Iodide tablets after the 
Chernobyl accident. This was the first large-scale test of 
this technique and the results show that it is effective:-
there were no side-effects and tests of the population 
show radio-Iodine levels in the thyroid that were 
significantly below the health limit [6]. 
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Interestingly, there is not as much concern about radio-
active Xenon and Krypton (which are also released in a 
DBA) as these are both inert gasses and do not chemically 
react in the human body. They are therefore breathed in 
and exhaled, irradiating the body only when in the lungs. 
However, Iodine remains in the body and is a serious 
heal th threat. As a reference, at Chernobyl, the release 
of Xenon had six times more radio-activity than the Iodine 
release [7], but the Iodine release was the important one 
as far as the population health is concerned. 
To control the release of Iodine, Sodium Hydroxide is 
added to the Containment Spray Water to react with the 
Iodine in the Containment atmosphere. Without the Sodium 
Hydroxide, the Iodine remains in the Atmosphere even 
though water is sprayed. However, with Sodium Hydroxide in 
the water, a reaction occurs with the Iodine and the 
result is NaOI, which is soluble in Water. Iodine is 
therefore not released should the Containment rupture as 
much of it is dissolved in the Containment Spray Water. 
Thus the Containment Spray system not only removes energy 
from the Containment Atmosphere, but it also controls the 
amount of Iodine in the Containment Atmosphere. 
2.6.4.2 The Containment Air Purification System. 
The second system provided to remove heat from the 
Containment atmosphere is the Containment Air Purification 
System. It consists of four cooling units:- during normal 
plant operation, containment air is circulated through 
heat exchangers in the cooling units to keep the air cool. 
However, in accident conditions, a high efficiency 
particulate air filter is brought into the air circulation 
path and is used to extract radio-active Fission Products 
7. 11CHERNOBYL: THE SOVIET-REPORT," Nuclear News, October 1986, pages 59 to 66. 
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from the Containment atmosphere. Again the Containment Air 
Purification System has the dual function of removing 
energy and 
atmosphere. 
Fission Products from the Containment 
Thus the Containment Spray System and the Containment Air 
Purification System both cool and clean up the containment 
atmosphere. 
2.6.5 The Combustible Gas Central System 
During the Three Mile Island accident, there was much 
concern that there was a build-up of Hydrogen gas inside 
the Containment Building. . The danger is that the 
concentration of Hydrogen could reach explosive levels and 
the Containment building would be damaged. The gas is 
generated in accident conditions by a reaction between the 
reactor coolant water and the Z ircalloy cladding of the 
fuel rods. This occurs at temperatures above 983 deg.C and 
becomes significant at temperatures above 1200 deg.C. 
Another source of Hydrogen is from the radiolysis of water 
in the Containment Sumps. Radiolysis is a reaction that 
takes place in water when it is irradiated with Gamma rays 
given off by the Fission Products washed down into the 
sumps. Hydrogen and Oxygen are produced. 
Two electric Hydrogen Combiners are usually provided, one 
as a spare. Should the Hydrogen Combiners fail to keep the 
Hydrogen concentration below 4 percent, the limit for 
explosiveness, then a purging system is used. Fresh air is 
blown into the Containment and the air drawn out is passed 
through High Efficiency Air Filters and Charcoal Filters 
to minimize the Environmental release of radio-active 
Fission Products. 
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2.6.6 The Habitability systems 
These systems are provided to protect the plant operators 
in accident conditions. The plant control room 
habitability system controls the temperature and humidity 
of the room and keeps it free from radio-activity, smoke 
and poisonous gasses. Food, water, medical supplies and 
sanitary facilities are provided to support seven people 
for a week. Protective clothing and breathing apparatus is 
also provided. 
2.6.7 The Emergency Core Cooling Systems 
In accident conditions, the purpose of these systems is to 
keep the Reactor Core sub-critical, that is, no self 
sustaining fission reactions occurring, and to remove the 
Core decay heat and prevent the melting of the Fuel rod 
cladding. 
There are three parts to the Emergency Core Cooling 
System: - the High Head Safety Injection System, the Low 
Head Safety Injection System, and the Accumulators. A 
schematic of the Emergency Core Cooling systems is given 
in Figure 2.8. 
2.6.7.1 The Accumulators 
The Accumulators are passive injection devices:- they are 
tanks containing water and pressurized Nitrogen at 45 Bar. 
A flap valve at the bottom of the tank remains shut so 
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45 Bar. When the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs, 
all the Primary system water (which was at 154 Bar and 340 
deg.C) flashes over to steam, and the core is uncovered. 
The pressure of the Primary Coolant system drops· to the 
containment building pressure and the pressurized Nitrogen 
in the Accumulator vessel forces the water out through the 
flap valve into the Reactor vessel. The Accumulators 
provide cooling water quickly before the Safety Injection 
pumps are fully operational. 
2.6.7.2 The High Head Safety Injection System 
The High Head Safety Injection pumps are able to inject 
water into the Primary Coolant System under normal 
operating conditions. The pressure is very high (154 Bar) 
and the flow is relatively small. These pumps are also 
used in the Chemical and Volumetric Control system to pump 
the water back into the Primary Coolant system. 
The High Head Safety Injection system is used to make up 
the water lost when there is a small Loss of Coolant 
Accident, that is, when there is a small leak in the 
Primary Coolant System. The source of injection water is 
the Refuelling Water Storage Tank which means that the 
water is Borated. 
The High Head Safety Injection system is also used to 
inject the contents of the Boron Injection Tank into the 
Primary Coolant System when a Main Steam Line Break 
accident occurs. Due to the thermodynamic consequences of 
the steam line break, there is a cooldown of the Primary 
Coolant System which in turn enhances the Nuclear fission 
process. This is why a massive injection of Borated water 
is necessary after a Steam Line break:- the Boron absorbs 
neutrons and stops the Nuclear fission process. 
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2.6.7.3 The Low Head Safety Injection system. 
A large Loss of Coolant Accident results in the loss of 
all the Primary Coolant. The Accumulators provide some 
cooling immediately after the rupture, but the Low Head 
Safety Injection PUmps provide long-term cooling. 
Initially, the cooling water is taken from the Refueling 
water storage tank, and when this tank is empty (all the 
water has been pumped into the Containment), suction is 
taken from the Containment· building sumps. The water in 
the Refueling Water Storage tank is Borated to inhibit the 
Nuclear fission process. 
The Low Head Safety Injection System therefore has two 
modes of operation:- the Direct Injection mode where water 
is drawn from the Refueling Water Storage tank, and the 
Recirculation mode, where water is drawn from the 
Containment Building sumps, cooled in heat-exchangers, and 
pumped back into the Primary Coolant System. In some 
plants, the actual pumps used to effect the Low Head 
Safety Injection function are the Residual Heat Removal 
pumps. 
Two sets of Safety Injection pumps are needed because high 
pressure and a large water flow are not economically 
provided by one pump design:- therefore, the High Head 
Safety Injection pumps are designed for high pressure and 
low flow (typically 173 Bar at 0.57 m3/min) while the Low 
Head Safety Injection pumps produce a large flow but at a 
low pressure (typically 19 m3/min at 5.8 Bar). 
Thus for all Primary Coolant system pressures likely to be 
encountered, the Emergency Core Cooling Systems can 
provide core cooling water. 
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2.6.8 The Auxiliary Feedwater System 
The final Emergency Core Cooling System is the Auxiliary 
Feedwater System (Figure 2.9) :- this system provides a 
flow of cooling water to the Secondary side of the Steam 
Generators in the event of the loss of normal Feedwater or 
a Main Steam Line Break. There are three Auxiliary 
Feedwater pumps:- two driven by electric motors, and one 
driven by a steam Turbine. The steam to drive the 
Auxiliary Feedwater Steam T~rbine is taken from the Steam 
Generator outlets and the water for the pumps can be taken 
from the Condensate Storage tank or from the Service Water 
system. 
The steam produced in the Steam Generators can be dumped 
either to the Atmosphere, or straight into the Turbine 
Steam Condenser. A heat transfer path therefore exists for 
energy to be extracted from the Primary Coolant System:-
the Auxiliary Feedwater system pumps water into the 
Secondary side of the Steam Generators where energy from 
the Primary Coolant System heats the water to steam which 
is dumped to the Atmosphere or the Turbine Condenser. 
2.6.9 The Engineered Safety Feature Support Systems 
The Emergency Safety Features require some support 
systems:-
2.6.9.1 The Ultimate Heatsink 
The Ultimate heats ink is where the decay energy can be 
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Figure 2.9 "The Auxiliary Feedwater System" 
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2.6.9.2 The service water System 
The Service water system pumps water from the Ultimate 
heatsink to the Emergency Safety System heat loads that 
have no radio-active risk:-
The Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 
The Reactor Building Cooling Units 
Air Conditioning Mechanical 
Habitability systems_. 
Chillers 
cooling water for the Diesel Generators. 
2.6.9.3 The Component Cooling Water System 
for the 
The Component Cooling Water System provides cooling water 
to the Containment Spray System Heat Exchangers. These 
heat exchangers pump highly radio-active water in certain 
accident conditions and, should a tube leak occur, the 
radio-activity will be detected and contained in the 
Component Cooling Water System. As the Component Cooling 
Water System is a closed loop, there will be no release of 
radio-activity to the Environment. 
2.6.9.4 The Emergency Electric Power Systems 
The last Emergency Safety Feature support system is the 
Emergency Electric Power System. Two diesel generator sets 
form the backbone of the Emergency power supply, with 
lead-acid batteries providing power for selected loads. 
38 
Thus the Engineered Safety Features protect the first 
Fission Product Barrier (the fuel rod cladding) by 
controlling the reactor core temperature and fission 
process stability with the Emergency Core Cooling.Systems 
and the Auxiliary Feedwater system. 
The Second Fission Product Barrier (the Primary Coolant 
System boundary) is protected by the Pressurizer Relief 
valves, the High Head Safety Injection of the large dose 
of Borated water, and the_Au~iliary Feedwater system. 
The Third Fission Product Barrier (the Containment 
building) is protected by the Containment Spray system and 
the Combustible Gas Control System. 
The concentration of radio-active Fission products in the 
Containment atmosphere is reduced by the Containment Spray 
system and the Containment Air Purification system. 
The Containment Isolation system ensures that few Fission 
Products escape from the Containment building. 
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2,7 summary. 
we have discussed the Nuclear fission process and 
discovered that the source of decay heat is the energy 
emitted by radio-active Fission Products. Further, we have 
explored the Nuclear Reactor and the associated systems 
required for the Normal generation of electric power. 
The systems utilized in Normal operation are:-
1. The Primary Coolant system containing:-
1.1 The Reactor vessel containing the Fuel rods and 
the Control Rods. 
1.2 The Reactor Coolant Pumps. 
1.3 The Steam Generators. 
1.4 The Pressurizer. 
2. The Chemical and Volume Control System. 
3. The Control Rods. 
4. The Residual Heat Removal System. 
5. The Steam Turbine and Generator comprising of:-
5.1 The Steam Turbine and Steam Condenser. 
5.2 The Generator. 
5.3 The Condensate and Feedwater pumps. 
5.4 The High and Low pressure heaters. 
5.5 The Oil Lubrication equipment. 
The Engineered Safety Features provided to minimize the 
impact of the postulated accidents by protecting the 
Multiple Fission Product Barriers are:-
1. The Containment Spray system. 
2. The Containment Air Purification System. 
3. The Combustible Gas Control System. 
4. The Habitibility Systems. 
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5. The Emergency Core Cooling Systems comprising of 
6. 
7. 
5.1 The Accumulators. 
5.2 The High Head Safety Injection system. 
5.3 The Low Head Safety Injection system. 
The Auxiliary Feedwater System 
The Engineered Safety Feature support 
comprising of 
7.1 The Ultimate Heats ink. 
7.2 The service Water system. 
7.3 The Component Cooling Water System. 
7.4 The Emergency Electric Power Systems. 
Systems 
At this point we have an overview of all the main systems 
in a typical Pressurized water Reactor Nuclear Power 
Plant. These systems have been provided to address the 
particular requirements of the Normal and Emergency 
operation of the power station. For the power station to 
pose only a small risk to the public these systems must 
have an appropriate reliability:- the special reliability 
requirements for Nuclear Power Plants will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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3. Special Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants 
We have seen previously why Nuclear Power Stations have 
such complex safety systems:- the overall aim of all these 
systems is to minimize the release of radio-active matter 
into the environment, during both Normal operation and 
Accident conditions. 
For the release of radio-active matter to be minimized, 
the safety systems must opeiate correctly. However, in the 
real world where the force rs for things to go from a 
state of order to state of disorder [8], the safety 
systems of a Nuclear Power Plant have a certain 
probability of changing state, possibly into a state of 
system failure. The techniques that have been developed to 
quantify the probability of system failures is known as 
Reliability Engineering. 
Nuclear Power Stations as whole must be reliable, as must 
the individual components in the safety systems:- the way 
this is achieved is to recognize that systems can fail, 
and to design the systems accordingly. 
This chapter has three sections:- the first addresses the 
reliability of equipment and systems; the second outlines 
the American Nuclear Regulatory requirements; and the 
third the IEEE Nuclear Specifications. 
3.1 Reliability 
We will initially consider the concept of Reliability by 
using a common example of a complex system that can have 
lethal effects in the event of failure:- the motor car. 
8. Boikess,R.S. and Edelson,E. "CHEMICAL PRINCIPLES", Harper & Row, New York, 1978, page 
394. 
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The following points illustrate the how the various 
activities of making a motor car can contribute to the 
reliability of the vehicle's operation. 
A. The Design of the vehicle: - the car could be a poor 
design with mechanical weakness in the chassis or 
engine. Engine failure at speed can have lethal 
consequences. An electrical example of a design 
weakness (although not lethal in the event of 
failure), is if the aiternator is operating at full 
output most of the time:-the stator windings will be 
near the maximum design temperature of the wire, and 
premature failure is likely as the life of electrical 
insulation is inversely proportional to the operating 
temperature. 
B. The Manufacture of the vehicle: - depending on the 
competence and motivation of the workers, at certain 
times the chances are high that certain components 
are not assembled as specified by the design. Thus, 
although the design is good, poor manufacture can 
cause failures. Other causes of failure due to 
manufacture are the use of incorrect material, the 
use of incorrect tools, and inexperience of the 
manufacturer. 
C. The activity of Inspecting and Testing the vehicle:-
the purpose of inspecting and testing both the parts 
and the assembled car is to detect design and 
manufacturing faults. If the motor car is not 
comprehensively tested in the manufactures works, 
then faults will persist and the vehicle will one day 
fail. 
D. The Operation of the vehicle:- if the owner of the 
motor car operates the car outside of the 
manufacturer's recommended limits, say he 
consistently runs the engine into the red zone on the 
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revolution counter:- then the engine will fail 
prematurely as the engine parts are overstressed. 
E. The Maintenance of the vehicle: - the · various 
components in a motor car have a finite service life 
and the manufacturer gives recommended times for 
replacement. For example, if the engine oil is never 
changed then the bearings in the engine will most 
likely fail early as they will not be lubricated as 
the designer intended.· 
The reliability of a motor car could be increased by 
improving the Design, Manufacture, Testing, Operation, or 
Maintenance of the vehicle. Any improvement will usually 
cost more and there will be . a point where the cost of 
increased reliability is not justified either in terms of 
economic viability or operational safety. There is 
therefore a trade-off between reliability and cost. 
3 .1.1 Measuring Reliability 
The reliability of a component is quantified as an 
expected failure rate. A power capacitor, for example, 
could have a failure rate of 0.1 per million hours 
operation. This means that if we have 1000 capacitors 
operating simultaneously, we can expect 100 to fail for 
every million hours of operation. That is, one every 
10 000 hours. 
44 
The reliability of a component can be determined by 
testing, or by using the operating history of a population 
of components. The failure rate of a component is not 
constant, but follows a "Bathtub" curve [9] as shown in 
Figure 3 .1. The number of failures is high initially as 
components fail due to small manufacturing defects. This 
is known as the "Burn-in" period. There-after, the failure 
rate is constant and this is the working life of the 
component. Finally, near the end of the component's life, 
the incidence of failures 'again increases: - this is the 
"Wear-out" period. Here bearings wear out and other aging 
mechanisms cause equipment failure. 
There are a number of sou~ces of reliability data:- many 
large organizations keep records of component failures, 
and after many years, they can predict fairly accurately 
the failure rates of these components. Two examples are 
included in the References [10] and [11]. 
3 .1. 2 Designing for Reliability 
There are many ways to design equipment that is reliable. 
The first is to use reliable components. Today the 
techniques for consistently making reliable components has 
been formalized into a new subject, that is, Quality 
Assurance. 
9. Report IEEE Standard 650 "IEEE STANDARD FOR QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E STATIC BATTERY 
CHARGERS AND INVERTERS FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1979. Appendix B, page 22. 
10. Report IEEE Standard 500 "RELIABILITY DATA", The Institute for Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers, New York, USA, 1977. 
11. United States of America, Military Document Ref.MIL HDBK 217 "RELIABILITY DATA". 
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3.1.2.1 Quality Assurance 
The control of the Design, Manufacture, Testing, 
operation, and Maintenance of an item to assure it's 
quality is often called Quality Assurance. Quality Control 
forms a part of Quality Assurance in that Quality Control 
happens in the Manufacturing and Testing phases. 
We have seen in our discussion about a motor car that 
Quality Assurance is _siniply common sense. But the 
advantage of using Quality Assurance techniques is that 
this common sense is written down in Quality Assurance 
procedures and is therefore not forgotten. 






Procedures for each of the above topics are developed:-
the Quality is assured because the controls and methods 
specified in the procedures are used to audit the work 
done. 
In Nuclear Power Plants the components that are important 
to the operation of the safety systems are designed, 
manufactured, inspected, installed, tested, operated, and 
maintained in accordance with an appropriate Quality 
Assurance program. The components are very reliable, but 
also expensive. 
Components not important to Nuclear safety are also given 
some form of the Quality Assurance program depending on 
their importance to the plant availability, or the expense 
of the component. The Generator Transformers, for example, 
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are expensive and vital to the plant availability:- they 
therefore have a comprehensive Quality Assurance program 
to assure their reliability. 
Thus, by using Quality Assurance techniques we can be 
assured that all work needed to produce an item (or a 
Nuclear Power Plant) is controlled and therefore the end-
product should be reliable. There are nevertheless some 
design techniques that 
reliability of a system. 
3.1.2.2 Over Rating 
significantly enhance the 
The over-rating of a component usually leads to a longer 
service life of that component. The Safety Injection pumps 
at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station are 710 kW motors, but 
the maximum load they have to drive is less than 650 kW. 




temperature and the insulation the ref ore 
The bearings and shaft are also less 
The concept of over-rating to provide reliability is 
intuitively recognized. One often hears the comment:- "In 
the old days things lasted much longer." Today to be cost 
effective we use advanced analysis to design items nearer 
the limit of failure, but in the past designers had no 
sophisticated computer analysis programs and items were 
therefore grossly over-designed to be safe. Thus the items 
lasted much longer. 
3.1.2.3 Redundancy 
The reliability of a system can be increased by using 
identical systems in parallel, that is, to have redundant 
systems so that if one fails, the redundant system is able 
to fulfil the system output requirements. 
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This approach is often used in equipment that has to be 
reliable. The American space shuttles use a number of 
computers in parallel to control the spacecraft. The 
actual control output is determined by a Majority Vote 
scheme. Thus if one computer fails, the craft will still 
be safely controlled by the remaining computers. 
Another everyday example is the brake system on a motor 
car:- the front and back 6rakes have separate hydraulic 
lines so that one line failing will not result in a 
complete brake failure. The handbrake is another redundant 
system for stopping the vehicle. 
3.1.2.4 Independence 
When two or more redundant systems are used to provide an 
output, it is important that the redundant systems are 
independent from each other. It would be pointless to have 
five redundant systems ali powered from the same electric 
power supply for they would all be disabled if that one 
power supply failed. 
In a motor car, the handbrake is independent from the 
footbrake:- the footbrake actuates the break pads 
hydraulically while the handbrake actuates the brake pads 
using a steel cable. 
In the new Advanced Gas Reactors in Britain, two redundant 
systems are used to control certain operations on the 
reactor: - apart from being physically independent, they 
use independent technologies. The one Division uses micro-
processor based equipment which is not vulnerable to 
earthquakes, while the other Division uses relays which 
are not vulnerable to temperature extremes (12] 
12. Daniels,G.H. "ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN FOR FUTURE AGR POWER STATIONS", IEE Proceedings C 
(Generation, Transmission and Distribution), Vollllle 128 no.2, March 1981, pages 123·8. 
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Generally, in Nuclear plants, separate power supplies and 
ventilation are used for each redundant system. The 
redundant systems are also physically separated from each 
other to prevent fires and explosions in one system from 
disabling the other systems. 
3.1.2.5 Periodic Testability 
Testing is an important part of keeping a system reliable. 
The ability to test a system, possibly on-line, is 
designed into systems that need to function reliably. 
Immediately after a piece of equipment has been tested, it 
is highly unlikely that it will fail as the test should 
have verified the functionality of all the parts of the 
equipment. However as time goes by, the chances of the 
equipment failing increases. Therefore if the equipment is 
tested frequently the probability of the system being 
inoperable due to a "hidden" failure will remain 
relatively small as the fault will be detected by the 
tests. This can be summarized as:- the probability that 
the equipment will fail is directly proportional to the 
failure rate of the equipment ( failures per year) and 
inversely proportional to the testing frequency. 
The logic part of Reactor Protection System at Koeberg is 
tested by injecting short pulses into the inputs and 
measuring the output of the system. This happens while the 
Reactor Protection System is actually monitoring the 
reactor, and the reason the output does not trip the 
reactor is that the output pulses are too short to 
activate the Reactor Trip Breakers. The testing frequency 
is very high and the system is therefore very reliable:- a 
fault is detected virtually as soon as it occurs. [13] 
13 This analysis assunes that the repair time is short. If the repair time is so long that 
the probability of another failure occurring is significant, then a more intricate 
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3.1.2.6 The single Failure Criterion 
The American Nuclear industry has defined a criterion that 
is used to formulate the configuration of the safety 
systems in Nuclear Power Plants. The IEEE Standard 3 79 
"IEEE standard Application of the Single Failure Criterion 
to Nuclear Power Generating Station Class lE equipment" 
[14] describes the criterion:- the Single Failure 
Criterion. 
The single Failure Criterion states that the system shall 
perform its protective function even with one single 
failure in the system. The failure mode must be detectable 
in the periodic testing of the system, or if the failure 
mode is undetectable, then the system must perform its 
protective action in the presence of all undetectable 
failures, and with any one single detectable failure. The 
reason for this is that if the failure is undetectable and 
could inhibit the system protective action in conjunction 
with a detectable failure, one could have a situation 
where a single detectable failure inhibits the system 
protective function. 
Using more than one redundant system to effect a 
protective function meets the requirements of the Single 
Failure Criterion provided that the redundant systems are 
independent. A single failure occurring in one redundant 
system will not prevent the other redundant systems from 
completing the protective function. If the redundant 
systems are not independent, say power for different 
redundant systems is supplied by a common switchboard:-
then the failure of this single component will inhibit the 
system protective function. 
analysis is necessary. The concept of frequent testing to lq,rove system reliability Is 
still valid however. 
14. Report IEEE Standard 379 "IEEE STANDARD APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION TO 
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATION CLASS 1E SYSTEMS", The Institute for Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1977 
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3.1.2.7 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
The Single Failure Criterion is useful for designing the 
configuration of safety systems, but does not provide a 
quantitative figure for the reliability of a protective 
function. In many instances it is important to know the 
different failure modes of a system and the frequency at 
which they are expected to occur. The most significant 
failure, may be due to a_Sihgle Failure, or it may be due 
to two independent failures. 
The failure modes and probabilities of systems can be 
determined by a Probabilistic Risk Assessment. This 
analysis technique is being utilized more and more 
frequently to determine the reliability of Nuclear Power 
stations. Koeberg Nuclear Power Station is licensed by the 
Atomic Energy Corporation based on Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments of the station. 
The acceptance criteria for Koeberg Nuclear Power Station 
are detailed in the Atomic Energy Corporation document 
LBGl [ 15) • This document is based on the Farmer Curve 
(Figure 3.2). Farmer based this curve on his proposal that 
a release of radio-active Iodine with an activity of 1000 
Curies should not happen more frequently than once in a 
1000 Years [ 16). As a comparison the release of radio-
active Iodine from Chernobyl amounted to 7.3 million 
Curies [17). The shape of the Farmer curve implies that if 
the health risk to the public of an event is large, then 
the likelihood of that event occurring must be kept small. 
Events that have a small impact can be quite common. 
15. Atomic Energy Board of South Africa "LICENSING OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT", docunent no. LBG/1, issue 3, May 1979. 
16. Winkler,B.C. "QUANTIFICATION OF SAFETY STANDARDS," Nuclear Safety and Reliability 
Assessment Course organized by the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa and the 
University of Cape Town, Pretoria, 24 June to 5 July, 1985. 
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The Atomic Energy Corporation has evaluated the siting of 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station and has produced a curve 
similar to the Farmer Curve which takes into account the 
acceptable risk per person living near the plant, and a 
survey of the wind conditions prevailing at the plant 
(18]. 
The core of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment is the Fault 
Tree. The Fault Tree for the braking system on a motor car 
is developed to illustra_te • the method. The schematic for 
the braking system is shown in~Figure 3.3. 
The Fault Tree for the Braking System {Fig. 3. 4) starts 
with the Top Event:- "Brakes fail to stop vehicle". This 
event occurs when the hydraulic brakes fail {Fig. 3.5 and 
3. 6) , and the handbrake fails (Fig. 3. 7) • Each of these 
events can be broken down further. For example, the 
hydraulic brakes fail only if both the front AND back 
break systems fail. The Fault Tree is developed down to 
the initiating events:- "Brake hydraulic pipe ruptures." 
as an example. 
once the Fault Tree is complete, cutsets of the fault tree 
are calculated using Boolean logic. Essentially, this is 
simplifying the logic equation defined by the fault tree. 
A cutset is a minimum combination of initiating events 
that cause the Top Event. Thus, labelling each initiating 
event alphabetically, the cutsets for our fault tree are:-
AGH, AJ, AK, BCGH, BCIJ, BCIK, DGH, DIJ, DIK, EGH, EJ, 
EK, FGH, FJ, and FK. The cutset AJ is the failure mode 
"Hydraulic pipe ruptures" AND "Hand brake lever fails": -
if these two events occur together, then the vehicle will 
have total brake failure. Similarly, each of the other 
cutsets result in total brake failure. 
18. Winltler,B.C. "QUANTIFICATION OF SAFETY STANDARDS," Nuclear Safety and Reliability 
Assessment Course organized by the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa and the 
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Figure 3.6 "Fault Tree for Back Brake System" 
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FAULT TREE FOR HAND BRAKE SYSTEM 
Figure 3.7 
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"Fault Tree for Hand Brake System" 
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Now a probability of failure is determined for each 
initiating event and these are propagated through each 
cutset of the Fault Tree. To simplify the mathematics, the 
value 0.001 is used for each initiating event. In reality, 
the values would be determined by testing, calculation, or 
by historical data. 
Cutset Probability 
AJ ; 1.0 X 10-6 
AK 1.0 X 10-6 
EJ .. 1.0 X 10-6 
EK 1.0 X 10-6 
FJ 1.0 X 10-6 
FK 1.0 X 10-6 
AGH 1.0 X 10-9 
DGH 1.0 X 10-9 
DIJ 1.0 X 10-9 
DIK 1.0 X 10-9 
EGH 1.0 X 10-9 
FGH 1.0 X 10-9 
BCGH 1.0 X 10-l2 
BCIJ 1.0 X 10-12 
BCIK 1.0 X 10-12 
Total: 6.0 X 10-6 
It is immediately obvious which are the more likely 
failure combinations. The most probable failure modes 
involve five initiating events:- "Hydraulic pipe ruptures" 
(A), "Brake pedal fails" (E), "Fluid reservoir cracked" 
(F), "Hand brake lever fails" (J), and "Hand brake cable 
fails" (K) . 
Thus even though the Single Failure Criterion applies and 
the car can be stopped in the presence of one failure, the 
probability of failure of the system may be considered too 
high and improvements may be needed. The Fault tree 
analysis identifies the most significant contributors to 
the Braking system unreliability. 
The loss of independence between redundant systems is a 
difficult situation to quantify:- these are known as 
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Common Mode Failures. In our motor car example, the event 
"Brake Fluid Reservoir cracked" is a Common Mode Failure 
because it will disable both the front and rear hydraulic 
systems. The solution is to prevent a single leak- (of the 
reservoir, or a burst brake pipe) from emptying the whole 
reservoir and this can be done by providing a separating 
wall between the outlets as shown in the insert in Figure 
3.3. 
Common Mode failures c~n 'result from Manufacturing or 
Maintenance errors, or from a Design problem on a 
component common to all redundant parts of the Safety 
System. Thus to prevent Common Mode Failures, the same 
technician should not service more than one redundant 
system, for he may make the same error on all redundant 
systems. The same principle is used when writing software 
for redundant computer systems: - have independent teams 
write the software using common input and output 
specifications. The probability that independent teams 
will make the same errors, is remote. 
Of course, a comprehensive Quality Assurance Program will 
reduce all failure modes including Common Mode Failures. 
This is the primary reason for the Qualification of Safety 
equipment [19] 
3 .1. 3 Equipment Qualification 
Part of the task of ensuring a reliable plant is to 
Qualify equipment for the Service Conditions. In a Nuclear 
Plant there are two special categories for the 
Qualification of equipment:- Environmental and Seismic. 
19. Report IEEE Standard 323 "IEEE STANDARD FOR QUALIFYING CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT FOR NUCLEAR 
POWER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New 
York, USA, 1983, page 10, sect.4 para.2. 
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3.1.3.1 Environmental Qualification 
The conditions inside the Reactor Containment building are 
harsh even in Normal operating conditions:- the radiation 
levels are typically 1 MRad per Year and the ambient 
temperature 40 deg.c. 
In Accident Conditions, the Radiation levels rise to 4 o 
MRad per year and the temperature and pressure peaks at 
170 deg.C and 3.8 Bar. r~spectively. In addition, the 
Containment Spray water contains Caustic Soda, Boric Acid, 
and various Radio-active Fission Products. 
Equipment that is inside the containment and that is 
required to operate during Accident conditions must be 
qualified to survive these arduous environmental 
conditions. 
3.1.3.2 Seismic Qualification 
Nuclear Power Stations built in areas susceptible to 
earthquakes are designed to withstand the largest probable 
earthquake of that area. All safety systems are therefore 
Seismically qualified. 
3.1.3.3 Qualification Methods 
Qualification methods used are:-
1. Type tests. For Environmental Qualification, samples 
of the Equipment are exposed to the postulated 
Environment; the equipment is considered qualified if 
it functions correctly after the required amount of 
exposure. For Seismic Qualification, samples of the 
equipment are stressed on a shake-table with the 
postulated forces due to a Design Base Earthquake. 
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Again, the equipment should survive and operate. The 
assumption is that if new equipment is manufactured 
_in the same way as those items type tested, then the 
new equipment is also qualified for installation in 
the Nuclear Power Plant. 
2. Operating Experience. If data from similar equipment 
indicates that it operates successfully under similar 
Service Conditions, then the new equipment can be 
considered qualifie~. 
3. Analysis. Equipment can be qualified by mathematical 
calculations. For example, electrical cabinets can be 
Seismically qualified using Finite Element analysis. 
An important requirement for reliable equipment is that 
all facets of the process used to make the equipment is 
fully specified. To this end, the authorities controlling 
the use of Nuclear power for commercial power generation 
have produced many specifications and guidelines. 
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3.2 American Regulatory Constraints 
In typical fashion, Mankind has sought to rationalize all 
the processes and requirements necessary to keep - Nuclear 
power safe. Historically the Americans were amongst the 
first to develop comprehensive regulatory requirements. 
Other nations have based their Nuclear programs on the 
American example, notably France whose Nuclear program is 
based largely on the American Westinghouse Pressurized 
Water Reactor. South Africa·, having purchased its Reactor 
from the French therefore- follows the us Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission requirements closely. 
Essentially, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lays down 
all the requirements for prospective applicants who want 
to build a commercial Nuclear Power Plant. The details of 
the licensing procedure and license requirements are 
published in the American Code of Federal Regulations 
Title 10 "Energy" Part 50 "Domestic licensing of 
production and utilization facilities" [20]. The short 
form reads 10CFR50. As an electrical designer, many 
sections of lOCFRSO are of no immediate concern, but the 
sections that are important are:-
lOCFRS0.34 
Appendix A 
"Contents of Applications; technical 
information" 
"General Design Criteria for Nuclear 
Power Plants" 
3.2.1 Technical Information 
The technical information 
Regulatory Commission must 
required by the Nuclear 
be in the form of Safety 
Analysis Reports. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report 
20 "Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 10, Energy", Published by the Office of the Federal 
Register, United States of America, January 1981. 
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must present all information necessary for the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to be able to ascertain the impact 
of the plant on public health and the environment. The 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report is submitted before the 
plant is built. When the plant is built, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report is submitted which is used to finally 
determine the overall safety of the Nuclear Power Plant. 
The Safety Analysis Reports contain a description of the 
design and operating fea_tutes of the Nuclear Power Plant 
and, to ensure a common framework, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission provide their minimum design requirements in 
Appendix A of ·lOCFRSO "General Design Criteria for Nuclear 
Power Plants." 
3.2.2 General Design Criteria 
The General Design Criteria applicable to Electric power 
systems are General Design Criteria 17 and 18. 
3.2.2.1 General Design Criterion 17 
The General Design Criterion 17 calls for two main sources 
of electric power:- onsite and offsite. These power 
sources should be designed so that the systems important 
to safety will always be available. The capacity and 
configuration of these power sources should be such that 
the Fission Product boundaries remain intact during all 
possible operational conditions, and that the reactor core 
is cooled and reactivity contained for all postulated 
accident conditions. 
The batteries and distribution systems of 
electric power supplies should have 





fulfill their safety functions even with a single failure 
occurring. 
The electric power from the offsite transmission. network 
should be supplied by two physically independent circuits 
which are designed and located so as to minimize the 
chances that they will fail simultaneously. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission allow a common switchyard and a 
common right of way for the two independent feeders. 
Again, each of the offsi~e power sources must be available 
independently of whether th& other one fails, or all 
onsite the power sources fail. One of the offsite electric 
power sources should be available in a few seconds 
following a Loss of Coolant Accident to ensure the 
containment of radio-active material. 
This General Design Criterion draws the designer's 
attention to the fact that neither a generator trip, nor 
an offsite power loss, nor any onsite power losses, shall 
cause the loss of any of the remaining power supplies. 
3.2.2.2 General Design Criteria 18 
General Design Criteria 18 gives the requirements for the 
inspection and testing of the electric power systems. The 
electric power systems important to safety should be 
designed so that periodic inspection and testing of the 
wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards can be 
carried out. The purpose of these inspections and test are 
to ensure that the electric power systems remain as 
reliable as possible. Both the systems as a whole, and the 
parts there-of are tested periodically under conditions 
that mimic the design operating state as closely as 
possible. Examples of system components are relays, 
switches and busbars; and system examples are the reactor 
protection system, and the electric power transfer systems 
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between the offsite, onsite and intra-unit power sources 
and sinks. 
A comprehensive summary of the sections of 10CFR50 that 
are of interest to the electrical designer is given in 
Appendix 1. 
3.2.3 Regulatory Guides 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commis&ion issues Regulatory Guides 
from time to time. The purpose of these guides is to make 
available to the public the methods acceptable to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff for implementing 
specific parts of the Commission's regulations, and to 
provide guidance for license applicants. 
Typical Regulatory Guides applicable to Electric Power 
Systems in Nuclear Power Plants are:-
1. Regulatory Guide 1.6 "Independence between redundant 
stand-by (onsite) power sources and between their 
distribution systems [21]." 
2. Regulatory Guide 
Qualification of 
Standby (Onsite) 
1.9 "Selection, Design and 
Diesel-Generator Units used as 
Electric Power Systems at Nuclear 
Power Plants [22]." 
3. Regulatory Guide 1. 32 "Criteria for Safety-related 
Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants 
[23]." 
21. Regulatory Guide 1.6 "Independence between redundant stand-by (onsite) power sources and 
between their distribution systems," United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, 
Washington, D.C. 20555. 
22. Regulatory Guide 1.9 "Selection, Design and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Units used 
as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.C. 20555. 
23. Regulatory Guide 1.32 "Criteria for Safety-related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear 
Power Plants," United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.C. 20555. 
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4. Regulatory Guide 1.53 "Application of the Single 
Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant protection 
system (24]." 
5. Regulatory Guide 1.75 
Electric Systems (25]." 
"Physical independence of 
24. Regulatory Guide 1.53 "Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant 
protection system," United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.C. 20555. 
25. Regulatory Guide 1.75 "Physical independence of Electric Systems," United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.C. 20555. 
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3,3 International Nuclear Standards 
Many countries have generated specifications for all sorts 
of things to provide a common framework for activities. 
Thus specifications for Nuclear Power Stations have also 
been generated. 
The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers in 
the United States of America has a large suite of Nuclear 
specifications which deal' with topics from Radiation 
Detectors to Emergency Diesel Generators for Nuclear Power 
Plants. 
Many European countries have their own Nuclear 
specifications:- these will not be examined in this thesis 
as they are similar in principle to the American 
specifications [26). 
3.3.1 IEEE Specifications 
The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
(IEEE) in the United States of America has published a 
series of Nuclear Standards which are intended to guide 






are met. Figure 3. a 
the different IEEE 
The central standard as far as Electric power is 
concerned, is IEEE 308 of 1980 "Standard Criteria for 
Class lE Power Systems" [27) which spells out in more 
26. For an extensive list of German, French, United Kingdom, American, and IEC standards, 
refer to IAEA·TECDOC-390 "SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ELECTRIC PO\JER SYSTEMS FOR 
NUCLEAR PO\JER PLANTS", subtitled "A manual on the use of IAEA Safety Series No.50-SG·D7: 
Emergency Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants", issued by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna, 1986. 
27. Report IEEE Standard 308 "IEEE STANDARD CRITERIA FOR CLASS 1E PO\JER SYSTEMS ~OR NUCLEAR 
PO\JER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New 
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detail the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements of 
General Design Criteria 17. The standard IEEE 603 of 1980 
"Standard Criteria for Safety Systems" [28] has a more 
general scope and does not apply to electrical power 
systems only, but to the protective and control systems as 
well. Both these standards refer to more specific 
standards that give requirements for Reliability Analysis, 
Periodic Testing, Independence, 
Equipment Qualification. 
Documentation, and 
IEEE 603 of 1980 "Standard Cri.teria for Safety systems" is 
applicable to all parts of the safety systems from the 
sensors to the actuators. The standard gives criteria for 





Sense and Command features: Equipment here includes 
the process variable sensors and all the signal 
processing, both continuous and discrete, right up to 
the input terminals of the execute features. Examples 
of these are pressure and temperature sensors along 
with the analogue signal processing equipment and the 
logic control circuitry. 
Execute features are equipment that receive signals 
from the Sense and Command feature output and perform 
some function. Examples of these are valve actuators 
and pump motors. 
Power Sources are equipment required to generate or 
transform power. Examples of these are the battery 
systems that feed inverters and switchgear. 
28. Report IEEE Standard 603 "IEEE STANDARD CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER 
GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, 
USA, 1980. 
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3.3.1.1 Safety Systems 
The concept of a Safety System composed of Safety Groups 
is developed in the IEEE Standards 308 and 603. 
The example given in Appendix A of IEEE 603 is useful for 
clarifying the components of a Safety System. 
1 DIVISIONS 
The Emergency Core Cooling system will be used as an 
example to illustrate the concept of a Division in a 
Safety System. A Division is a set of components, 
physically and electrically independent from other 
redundant sets of components. 
In terms of the analysis in IEEE 308 & 603, a 
Division is divided into three sections. The first is 
the "Sense and Command Features". The Sense and 
Command Features of a Division of the Emergency Core 
Cooling System are shown in Figure 3.9:- various 
sensors detect pressures, temperatures and other 
physical quantities from the reactor. The Reactor 
Protection System implements the Protection Logic 
that determines when a Safety Injection is necessary. 
The Command signals originate in the Reactor 
Protection Logic. 
The Execute Features are added in Figure 3. 10: - The 
Safety Injection Pumps and the Emergency Core Cooling 
System heat exchanger is shown. The injection water 
is taken from a large storage tank initially, and 
when this is empty, the water is re-cycled from the 
Containment Building Sumps. Motor operated valves are 
used to select source of the injection water. 
Some Auxiliary support features are added in Figure 
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Service Water system are used to transfer heat from 
the Emergency Core Cooling System heat exchanger. 
The Emergency Core Cooling System equipment is cooled 
by Air Conditioning plant: - without this the 
Emergency Core Cooling Pump motors would overheat. 
The last Auxiliary support feature added is the Class 
lE power systems (Fig. 3.12). The heart of the Class 
lE power system is . a • Diesel Generator which powers 
the Emergency Core Cooling System actuators when the 
Off-site power systems fail. The Diesel Generator 
generates power at Medium Voltage; the large loads 
are supplied at this Medium Voltage while the small 
loads, like the motor. operated valves and air 
conditioning are supplied with Low Voltage. The Low 
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2 SAFETY SYSTEMS 
A Safety system has a Safety Function: - the Safety 
Function for the Emergency Core Cooling System is to 
remove heat from the reactor after an accident. A 
Safety System consists of a number of redundant 
Safety Groups: - a Safety Group is a combination of 
Divisions. 
If each Division has· 100% capacity to fulfil the 
Safety Function, then in-terms of the Single Failure 
Criterion, only two redundant Safety Groups are 
required. 
If each redundant Division has only 50% capacity, 
that is, two Divisions are necessary to fulfil the 
Safety Function, then in terms of the Single failure 
Criterion, three redundant Divisions forming three 
Safety Groups are required. This is shown in Figure 
3.13:- a single failure in one Division inhibits two 
Safety Groups, but the remaining Safety Group is able 
to complete the Safety Function. 
Often, four 50% capacity Divisions are installed: -
three are necessary for the safe operation of the 
plant while the fourth can be tested and maintained. 
Thus, all divisions can be tested and maintained 
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Over the years, as people have tried to make equipment 
more reliable, techniques have been developed to:-. 
1. Measure equipment reliability. 
2. Control the Design process. 
3. Control the Manufacturing process. 
4. Control Equipment Inspection and Testing 
5. Control the Installatidn of Equipment. 
Designers have developed configuration strategies to 
ensure a better reliability:-
1. Components are over-rated. 
2. Systems are divided into redundant divisions which 
are independent. 
3. Equipment is tested regularly to ensure operability. 
For Nuclear Power Plants, special techniques have been 
developed to assure reliability:-
1. The Single Failure Criterion is used to determine the 
configuration of systems important to safety. 
2. Probabilistic Risk Assessment is used to assess the 
overall reliability of systems. 
3. Equipment is Qualified to assure that it will operate 
under the special Environmental and Seismic 
conditions present in Nuclear Power Plants. 
Thus methods have been developed to make equipment that is 
reliable for use in commercial Nuclear power reactors and 
techniques have been developed that measure the risk posed 
to the public by these Nuclear Power Plants. 
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The American Nuclear industry has generated a large body 
of documentation to define and control the use of 
commercial Nuclear power. Specifically, the Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers has developed 
Specifications for the Electrical and Electronic equipment 
used in Nuclear Power Plants. 
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4. Electric Power systems in Nuclear Power Plants 
At this point the reader has had an introduction to 
Nuclear Power Plant systems and the special requirements 
for Nuclear Power Plants. The details of the electric 
systems at a typical Pressurized Water Nuclear Power Plant 
will be discussed in this chapter. The emphasis will be to 
see how these special requirements for Nuclear plants 
dictate the configuration and design of the electrical 
equipment. 
The major electric loads in a typical Pressurized Water 
Nuclear Power Plant will be compiled and the equipment 
function classified, that is, whether the load is part of 
the Engineered Safety Features-, or not. 
4.1 Electric Power Loads 
The electric loads differ depending on the power station 
operating state. Three general plant states can be 
defined:- the Normal plant operation is the state the 
plant is in for most of its life, that is, generating 
electric power. When it is off load for the refuelling of 
the Nuclear reactor, the plant is in the Refuelling, or 
outage state, and when something goes wrong in the Nuclear 
related part of the plant, it is in an Accident state. 
The major electric loads in a typical Westinghouse 
Pressurized Water Reactor, classified by Plant State, are 
now presented [29][30]. 
29. Electricite de France, "PALIER-900, 11 Information brochure, June 1982. 
30. Electricite de France. "EDF 900 MWe NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, SHORT TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION." 
issued by Service d•Equipment Nucleaire Exterieur, 11-13 Avenue de Friedland, 75008 
PARIS, May 1983. 
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4.1.1 Normal Plant Operation 
The primary function of a generating plant is to produce 
electrical power of a specified quality. In- normal 
operation, the plant should be reliable:- a plant that is 
always breaking down is not very economic. The degree of 
reliability required for any generating plant is 
determined from economical considerations. 
4.1.1.1 Electric Loads in the Nuclear Systems 
The major electric loads on the Nuclear part of the plant 
during Normal operation are:-
1. Three Reactor Coolant pumps, each absorbing 7200 kW 
at Medium Voltage (6.6 kV). 
2. Two High Head Safety Injection pumps, each absorbing 
710 kW at Medium Voltage. 
4.1.1.2 Electric Loads in the Conventional systems 
The major electric loads on the Turbo-generator during 
normal plant operation are:-
1. Three Condensate pumps, each absorbing 3 500 kW at 
6.6 kV. 
2. Three Drainwater pumps, each absorbing 3 000 kW at 
6.6 kV 
3. Two Circulating Water pumps, each absorbing 3 000 kW 
at 6.6 kV. 
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4.1.2 Plant at Refuelling Shutdown 
The main electric loads during the refuelling shutdown 
are:-
1. Two Residual Heat Removal pumps, each absorbing 355 
kW at 6.6 Kv. 
4 .1. 3 Plant under Accide~t Conditions 
The Engineered Safety Features require power in Accident 
Conditions. The principle electric loads in the Engineered 
Safety Features are:-
1. Two High Head Safety Injection pumps each absorbing 
710 kW. 
2. Two Low Head Safety Injection Pumps each absorbing 
250 kW. 
3. Two Containment Spray pumps each absorbing 450 kW. 
4. Ventilation Systems totalling 1000 kW. 
5. Four Service Water pumps each absorbing 225 kW. 
6. Four Component Cooling Pumps each absorbing 400 kW. 
4.2 Powering these Loads 
We have seen that there are three distinct categories of 
electric load on a typical Nuclear Power Station:- those 
loads needed only during normal operation, those needed 
during the refuelling shutdown, and those needed in the 
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lead to a significant risk increase during Refuelling 
Outages. 
In the intermediate stages when the plant is shut-down but 
the Primary Coolant System is not yet opened for 
Refuelling, the Engineered safety Feature systems are kept 
available to remove decay heat in an Emergency situation. 
Thus during the Refuelling outages when all the Fuel has 
been removed from the Reactor Vessel, the Engineered 
Safety Feature switchboards. are supplied from the 
Permanent supplies allowing the Diesel Generator sets to 
be serviced. 
An alternate source of ac _power is provided via the 
Auxiliary transformers. These can supply the Permanent 
Equipment Boards if there is a transfer between the Unit 
transformer source (LGA) and the Auxiliary transformers. 
Thus, during the outage when the Generator is off-line, 
the Permanent loads are supplied via the Auxiliary 
transformers. 
In the event of an accident, the Engineered Safety 
Features draw electric power from the Safety Related 
switchboard (LHA). The power for this board can be sourced 
from either the Generator if it is operating, or from the 
Auxiliary Transformers, or from the Diesel Generators. 
Thus, even if the off-site power fails, the Diesel 
Generators will still supply the Equipment important to 
safety. 
The description above describes only one Safety Division, 
or Train. There is another identical redundant Train which 
supplies Equipment required for Normal, Permanent, or 
Safety-related operation (LGD, LGC, and LHB). 
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Figure 4.2 shows where the loads described in Section 4.1 
are connected to the system. 
The low voltage ac power is used to supply small-loads:-
typically, loads with power ratings of less than 160kW. 
Examples are valve actuators and small motors. 
The de system provides power for equipment control:-
switchgear control, diesel generator control, and 
Auxiliary Feedwater sys"t:,em • control. The de system also 
supplies power via inverters ~o the Vital Instrumentation 
and Control ac busses which power the Reactor Protection 
Systems. 
The electric system layout described meets the Regulatory 
requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix A as there are two 
physically independent sources of power from the off-site 
grid, and there are two onsite diesel generators to 
provide emergency power in the event of off-site power 
loss. The onsite system is divided into two independent 
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4.2.2 The Alternating Current Power Systems 
The parts of the electric power supply system will now be 
discussed and the Regulatory requirements described. 
4.2.2.1 Floating Neutral 
Not using Direct Grounding the neutral in the Medium 
voltage systems has ~er~ain advantages [ 3 3] : - the 
distribution system can tolerate one earth fault without 
the need to isolate the - faulty cable or piece of 
equipment. The plant availability is therefore enhanced. 
The neutral grounding resistors are sized to absorb the 
maximum power developed from the capacitive currents which 
flow when one phase is grounded. The high resistance 
neutral resistor also minimizes the transient voltages 
caused by arcing grounds and, by 1 imi ting the current 
flow, the fault does not cause so much damage. 
Typical maximum earth fault currents are 35 Amperes on 
12 kV systems and 7 Amperes on 4.16 kV systems. 
4.2.2.2 The Diesel Generator Sets 
The requirements for Diesel Generators at Nuclear Power 
Plants are set down in the IEEE Standard 387 "Criteria for 
Diesel Generator Units applied as Standby Power Supplies 
for Nuclear Generating Stations" [ 34] . Essentially, the 
diesel generator set must be physically independent from 
the power station, and electrically independent from the 
off-site power supply system. 
33. Nielsen,D. "AUXILIARY PO'olER SYSTEM FOR THE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PLANT," IEEE Power 
Engineering Society Sumer Meeting (Text of A Papers), Portland, ORE, USA, 18-23 July 
1976, pages A76 300-4/1-5. 
34. Report IEEE Standard 387 "IEEE STANDARD CRITERIA FOR DIESEL-GENERATOR UNITS APPLIED AS 
STANDBY PO'olER SUPPLIES FOR NUCLEAR PO'olER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1977. 
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The block diagram of a typical Diesel Generator set is 
given in Figure 4.3:- typically the Generator can produce 
about 5000 kVA at Medium Voltage. 
Special features of Diesel Generators used for Emergency 
Power Generation at Nuclear Power Stations are:-
1 Dual Starting Syste~s 
To make the start-up process more reliable, the 
diesel has two starting systems:- one is a pneumatic 
turbine powered by compressed air, and the other is a 
direct feed of compressed air into the engine 
cylinders. In addition, the diesel is always kept 
warm by keeping the water cooling system warm. 
2 Reliable Cooling Systems 
Some diesel configurations use an air cooling system 
consisting of force draft cooled radiators to remove 
the diesel engine heat losses. Others use a heat 
exchanger cooled by the plant Service Water System. 
The disadvantage of this is that the diesel will 
overheat of the Service Water system fails. 
3 Automatic Loading of the Diesel Generator 
On receipt of a Engineered Safety Feature actuation 
signal, the Diesel engine starts up and all electric 
loads on the Engineered Safety Feature switchboard 
( LHA) are disconnected. The incomer from the 
Permanent supplies is also opened. After 10 seconds 
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to the Engineered Safety Feature switchboard is 
closed. 
The loads are re-connected in blocks so that the 
Diesel Generator output voltage and frequency do not 
vary excessively. 
4 Periodic Testing 
The principle of periodie testing is used to ensure 
that the diesels are reliable. The IEEE standard 
recommends that the Diesel Generator be tested on 
load at least once per month. The diesel control 
logic allows automatic switch-over from the test mode 
to the operating mode if the Engineered Safety 
Feature actuation signal occurs while the Diesel is 
being tested on load. 
4.2.2.3 The Preferred Power Supply. 
The IEEE Standard 765 "Preferred Power Supply for Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations" (35] is provided to give 
detailed design criteria for the Pref erred Power Supply 
and expands on the requirements given in 10CFR50 and in 
IEEE standard 308 "Standard Criteria for Class lE Power 
Systems". 
The Preferred Power Supply should consist of at least two 
independent circuits from the off-site transmission system 
connected to the Class lE power distribution system. 
Figure 4. 4 shows a typical configuration. The Preferred 
Power Supply is not a Class lE system and therefore does 
not need to meet the Class lE requirements for redundancy, 
independence, separation, the single Failure Criterion, 
35. Report IEEE Standard 765 "IEEE STANDARD FOR PREFERRED POWER SUPPLY FOR NUCLEAR GENERATING 

















,,,.- I ' HAIN ( )._ j GENERATOR ) 
'( _, NON CLASs·,-E·a-us_A ____ _ 
) 
IEEE Std 765 
+ 
) 
NON CLASS 1 E BUS B 
) 
IEEE Std 765 
• IEEE Std 301 
CLASS 1 E BUS A 
? IEEE Std 301 
CLASS 1 E BUS B 
Figure 4.4 "Typical Layout of Preferred Power Supply" 
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Seismic and equipment qualification. This does not mean 
that the use of physical independence or any of the other 
criteria for reliability used for Class lE equipment 
cannot be used for the Preferred Power Supply:- the 
application there-of is determined using a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
A typical layout of a Preferred Power Supply for a French 
900 MW station is shown in Figure 4 .1. The generator 
electric output is trans~onned to 400kV and carried to the 
400kV switchyard where the power joins the Grid network. 
The Unit auxiliaries are powered by a Unit auxiliary 
transformer. 
The alternate (Backup) off~si~e power supply is taken from 
the 225kV switchyard and transformed to 6.6 kV by two 
auxiliary step-down transformers. 
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The reliability of the Off-site grid network is very much 
dependent on the grid configuration. In the United States 
of America, the probabilities for the loss of Off-site 
power are as follows (36]:-
Type of Failure Failures per Year 
Loss longer than 30 minutes 0.041 
Loss less than 30 minutes 0.044 
• 
Loss of Backup off-site power 0.012 
but not Normal power. .. 
Loss of Normal supply, but 0.056 
not Backup power. 
The reliability of the grid network is improving because 
plants with repetitive problems have implemented major 
corrective actions, and because as more plants are added 
to the grid network the number of interconnections grows. 
In the winter of 1983/84, Sweden had a major failure in 
its grid network which resulted in the loss of 40% of the 
countries electric loads (37]. None of the Nuclear plants 
in Sweden managed to transfer successfully to House Load 
mainly due to the nature of the grid disturbances and 
deficiencies in the adjustment of the House Loading 
systems. The Engineered Safety Feature Diesel Generators 
were used to supply the critical plant loads in the power 
stations and all Diesels started successfully. But the 
fact that the Nuclear stations did not House Load and were 
therefore unable to quickly pick up load again after the 
incident was noted by many laymen in Sweden. 
36. Wyckof,H. "LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER EXPERIENCE AT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS-ALL YEARS 
THROUGH 198411 , Proceedings of the American Power Conference, Chicago,Il,USA, 22-24 April 
1985, pp 791-6. 
37. Reisch, F. "TECHNICAL NOTE: SIJEDEN'S DECEMBER 1983 GRID COLLAPSE AND THE NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT'S RESPONSE", Nuclear Safety, Vol.26, No.2, March/April 1985, pp 153-6. 
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4.2.3 Direct Current Power Sources 
The IEEE provide a standard summarizing the requirements 
for the design, qualification, maintenance and testing of 
Safety-related de power systems. It is the IEEE Standard 
946 "IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Safety 
Related DC Auxiliary Power Systems for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations" [38]. 
Typical de system loads ~re Circuit breakers, Relays, 
Solenoids, and Inverters. In terms of the Class lE power 
system criteria, each safety-related Division should have 
its own independent de power supply system. The de power 
can be provided by one battery, or two batteries can be 
used:- one for power circuits and the other for control 
loads. 
Supplying non Class lE loads from the Safety-related de 
power supplies is discouraged as these loads are not 
Qualified and could, for example, cause a short circuit on 
a Class lE de busbar if the supply breaker should fail to 
trip. There are, therefore, non Class lE batteries at 
Nuclear power Stations which are used to supply loads on 
the Turbo-generator set, the High Voltage Switchyard, and 
Emergency Lighting for example. 
In addition to the Safety-related batteries provided for 
each Division of the Engineered Safety Features, Safety 
Related batteries are provided for the Reactor Protection 
System as well. The reason is that this protects the 
Reactor from unnecessary transients that could occur if 
spurious power failures caused the Reactor Protection 
System to trip the reactor, or even initiate a Safety 
Injection. 
38. Report IEEE Standard 946 "IEEE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR THE DESIGN OF SAFETY RELATED DC 
AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1985. 
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The basic de system configuration is shown in Figure 4.5:-
the battery is on Float charge while the battery charger 
supplies the de loads. The battery supplies the loads when 
the ac power to the charger fails, or when the peak load 
on the battery charger exceeds the maximum charger output. 
The battery chargers for Safety-related de systems are 
supplied with power derived from the Diesel backed 
Emergency power distribution boards. 
4.2.3.l Batteries 
Lead-acid batteries are used extensively in power stations 
because they are relatively cheap and are made in large 
sizes. A typical pasted plate lead-acid battery is shown 
in Figure 4. 6. The plate consists of a lead-alloy grid 
which has openings for the porous lead active material. 
The lead-alloy is used to give mechanical strength to the 
plate and to provide an efficient conduction path for the 
electricity. 
These batteries are, however, not perfect. Three side 
reactions affect the efficiency and life of Lead-acid 
batteries [39]:-
1. The decomposition of water resulting in Oxygen and 
Hydrogen. The equilibrium voltage for this reaction 
is 1.23 Volts. Even though the open circuit voltage 
of Lead-acid cells is about 2. o Vol ts, the rate of 
Hydrogen and oxygen generation is extremely low. The 
end result of this process is the loss of water from 
the cell. 
39. Berndt,D. "STATIONARY LEAD ACID BATTERIES, OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS, FUTURE ASPECTS," 
presented at Syqx,siun on Standby & Uninterruptable Power Supplies, organized by South 
African Institute of Electrical Engineers and The Association of M111icipal Electricity 
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Figure 4.6 "The Pasted Plate Lead-acid Cell" 
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2. The Hydrogen generated by the decomposition of water, 
even though at a low rate, does affect the negative 
electrode of the cell:- this electrode supplies the 
electrons needed for the Hydrogen evolution and 
consequently results in the gradual discharge of the 
electrode. This is known as the "self-discharge" of 
the lead acid cell, and is the reason that lead-acid 
cells need constant recharging. Cells are "Float" 
charged at a constant voltage sufficiently high to 
counteract the "self discharge" and keep the 
electrodes charged. 
3. The corrosion of the Cell internals. Most of the cell 
conducting parts contain lead and where the lead is 
part of the positive electrode, the Sulphuric Acid of 
the cell gradually eats the lead away. The reactions 
are complex, but typically result in the corrosion 
loss of 1 to 2% of the lead in the positive electrode 
per year. 
Thus the maintenance of lead acid batteries essentially 
consists of floating the cells at a suitable voltage to 
overcome the self-discharge phenomenon and topping up the 
cell electrolyte level with water to replace that lost due 
to the decomposition of water. 
The sizing of the batteries is discussed in the IEEE 
Standard 485 "IEEE Recommended Practice for Sizing Large 
Lead storage Batteries for Generating stations and 
Substations" [40] and is dependant on a number of factors. 
The first step is to determine how long the de loads need 
to be supplied with power in the event of an ac power 
failure. The configuration and reliability of the power 
station ac power system is used in this evaluation:- how 
40. Report IEEE Standard 485 "IEEE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR SIZING LARGE LEAD STORAGE 
BATTERIES FOR GENERATING STATIONS AND SUBSTATIONS", The Institute for Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1983. 
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long will it take to restore ac power to the Safety-
related battery chargers? How many Diesel generators are 
there and is there sufficient flexibility in the ac 
distribution network to allow Cross-ties .between 
distribution boards? Or are there cross-ties in the de 
systems? 
The process of determining the required de supply duration 
therefore involves previous operating experience with 
different network co~fi~rations, and Engineering 
judgement. 
Once the supply duration is established, typically between 
O. 5 hours and 4 hours, the battery duty cycle for that 
period must be determined. Usually, a number of scenarios 
will become apparent depending on the type of equipment 
failure causing the power loss, and these will form the 
final battery duty cycle. The battery is sized to meet the 
power requirements of the loads (as defined by the duty 
cycle) for the duration determined by the plant 
configuration and equipment reliability. 
The IEEE recommendations for installation of batteries are 
contained the IEEE Standard 484 "IEEE Recommended practice 
for Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead 
Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations" 
[ 41] . 
The location of the battery is discussed:- for example, 
the location should be free from vibration, be clean and 
dry, not have large temperature variations, and water 
rinsing facilities should be provided to was off spilt 
acid. The mounting of the battery is commonly in a single 
tier steel rack with the cell bases isolated from the 
floor with porcelain insulators. 
41 • Report IEEE Standard 484 11 IEEE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR I NSTALLA Tl ON DES I GN AND 
INSTALLATION OF LARGE LEAD STORAGE BATTERIES FOR GENERATING STATIONS AND SUBSTATIONS", 
The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1981. 
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The ventilation of the battery room should limit the 
hydrogen accumulation to less than 2% under all operating 
conditions. 
The IEEE recommendations for 




in the IEEE 
Standard 450 "Recommended Practice for Maintenance, 
Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries 
for Generating stations and'Substations" [42]. 
Maintaining batteries is an art: - the detailed operation 
of lead acid cells is still not completely understood and 
to detect deterioration in cells is not easy. The battery 
is at Float charge most of the time between Unit Outages 
with monthly Equalizing charges. The duration between 
outages is typically 12 months extending up to 18 months 
in some cases [43]. There is no opportunity to "work" the 
cells by performing discharges and complete charging while 
the Unit is on-line so the potential for gradual discharge 
is high. The French battery supplier for the cells at 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station recommends a discharge-
charge cycle at least once a year; the more frequent, the 
healthier the battery [44]. Thus, the operational and 
maintenance 
satisfied. 
requirements cannot be simultaneously 
42. Report IEEE Standard 450 "RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR MAINTENANCE, TESTING, AND REPLACEMENT 
OF LARGE LEAD STORAGE BATTERIES FOR GENERATING STATIONS AND SUBSTATIONS", The Institute 
for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1980. 
43. Electricite de France. "EDF 900 MWe NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, SHORT TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION." 
issued by Service d'Equipment Nucleaire Exterieur, 11·13 Avenue de Friedland, 75008 
PARIS, May 1983. Page 59. 
44. Tudor representative, verbal COlllllJl"lication, February 1987. 
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A typical monthly battery maintenance inspection would 
include:-
1. A visual inspection of the cleanliness .of the 
installation. 
2. Charger output voltage and current. 
3. Electrolyte levels. 
4. Visual inspection for cracks or electrolyte leakage. 
s. Ambient temperature and operation of ventilation. 
6. Pilot cell voltage and~specific gravity. 
The three monthly inspections include all the monthly 
activities as well as:-
1. The terminal voltage ~nd specific Gravity of each 
cell. 
2. The electrolyte temperature of selected cells. 
At the Unit outage, the intercell connections are re-
torqued and a qualification discharge is done on the 
battery. The battery is replaced if the Capacity is 80% of 
the manufacturer's rating. 
Using Specific Gravity to ascertain the cell state of 
charge is fraught with problems. A Specific Gravity 
gradient may exist in cells that are charged at high 
currents:- the high Specific Gravity acid generated during 
the charging sinks to the bottom of the cell. When the 
Specific Gravity is measured (at the top of the cell), a 
low value is indicated which will gradually increase as 
the diffusion process equalizes the Specific Gravity 
gradient. 
A similar effect occurs when water is added to the cell to 
make up for water lost during Float operation:- the water 
dilutes the electrolyte near the top of the cell and 
misleading Specific Gravities can be measured. 
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Other small difficulties encountered when measuring 
Specific Gravity are that the temperature of the 
electrolyte affects the Specific Gravity, and the level of 
the electrolyte in the cell also affects the Specific 
Gravity:- the lower the level, the more concentrated the 
chemicals in the electrolyte become, and the Specific 
Gravity therefore increase~. 
The applicable IEEE Standard for the Qualification of 
Lead-acid cells is:- IEEE Standard 535 "IEEE Standard for 
Qualification of Class lE ~ad Storage Batteries for 
Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (45]. 
Lead acid batteries for use in Nuclear Power Plant are 
qualified in terms of the chemical and physical 
deterioration due to aging, and in terms of their ability 
to withstand postulated earthquakes. Qualification can be 
done by three methods, that is:- Type Testing, Operating 
Experience, and Analysis. 
At the present state of the art, the IEEE cautions against 
using mathematical modelling of aged cells as the 
processes are complex. 
Cells to be qualified by Type testing are aged either 
naturally or by an accelerated aging process. The 
accelerated aging process consists of keeping the cells at 
an elevated temperature for a defined period of time. 
Tubular cells, for example, are aged by one year for every 
2 3 days they· are kept at 71 deg. c. The actual 
qualification test is performed on the aged cells and 
basically consists of a stringently controlled 3 hour 
discharge which establishes the cell capacity. 
45. Report IEEE Standard 535 "IEEE STANDARD FOR QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E LEAD STORAGE 
BATTERIES FOR NUCLEAR POI.IER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1979. 
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The aged cell Seismic withstand capability is tested on a 
shake-table with a representative load current flowing 
during the test. Any fluctuations in the cell's voltage or 
current indicate a weakness in the cells under test. After 
the Seismic test, the cells are again capacity tested with 
a 3 hour discharge. 
The battery rack is also qualified for Seismic events. 
However, the rack can be qualified by analysis as well as 
in a shake test. 
4.2.3.2 Battery Chargers 
The IEEE requirements for Class lE battery chargers are 
contained in the IEEE Standard 650 "IEEE Standard for 
Qualification of Class lE Static Battery Chargers and 
Inverters for Nuclear Power Generating stations" [46). The 
battery charger must supply the continuous design de load 
of the battery (which is the de board load) and must also 
supply a certain current to charge the battery as well. 
Typically this is 10% of the batteries 8 hour ampere-hour 
rate:- if the battery is a 1000 Ah, then the charging 
current that must be provided by the charger is 100 
Amperes. 
Three types of battery 
American Nuclear Power 
chargers 
Plants:-
are commonly used on 
The Silicon Controlled 
Rectifier solid state type, the controlled ferro-resonant 
type, and the magnetic amplifier type. The Silicon 
Controlled Rectifier type comprise some 75% of the 
chargers used and is the only type now Qualified for Class 
lE use [47). 
46 Report IEEE Standard 650 "IEEE STANDARD FOR QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E STATIC BATTERY 
CHARGERS AND INVERTERS FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS", The Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, USA, 1979. 
47. Gunther,W.E., Subudhi ,M.,and Taylor,J.H. "OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND AGING-SEISMIC 
ASSESSMENT OF BATTERY CHARGERS AND INVERTERS", NUREG/CR-4564, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Conmission, June 1986. Page 2-1. 
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The design of Silicon Controlled Rectifier battery 
chargers is not complex, but the qualification process is 
extensive. Figure 4.7 shows the IEEE Flowchart for 
Qualification of Class lE Battery Chargers and Inverters. 
Essentially, the Safety-related parts are identified by 
Engineering Judgement and by a Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis. Of the Safety-related components, those that 
have age-related failure mechanisms are identified and 
aged. All components are then assembled into the Battery 
Charger and the charger thed undergoes the following tests 
in order:-
Initial functionality tests 
Radiation Testing 






The Performance test is done at room temperature and 
humid! ty. The .Stress test is done with the temperature 
varying between the maximum and minimum Service 
temperatures, while the humidity is increased to the 
maximum specified in the Service conditions. 
Any failures are evaluated and the design changed if 
necessary. 
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PROVIDE SPECIFICATION DATA(4) 
------------J CLASSIFY COMPONENTS TO DETERMINE 
WHICH ARE SAFETY RELATED (:I.I) 





PERFORM FMEA (:I.I.I) 
COMPONENTS WITHOUT 
AGE RELATED FAILURE 
MECHANISMS 
NONSAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS 
AS VERIFIED SY FMEA 
NO AGING REQUIRED 
SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS 
PERFORM STRESS ANALYSIS (:1.1.2.1) 
CLASSIFY COMPONENTS WITH OR 
WITHCUT AGE RELATED 
FAILURE MECHANISMS (:1.1.2.2) 
COMPONENTS WITH AGE-RELATED FAILURE MECHANISMS 
DETERMINE COMPONENT 
QUALIFIED LIFE (:1.2) 
IF LESS THAN EOUIPMENT 
QUALIFIED LIFE 
IF GREATER THAN EQUIPMENT 
QUALIFIED LIFE 
AGE COMPONENTS TO EQUIPMENT 
QUALIFIED LIFE (5.3.1.1) 
AGED COMPONENTS 
ASSEMBLE COMPONENTS IN 
EQUIPMENT (:1.3.J.2) 
INITIAL INSPECTION ANO TESTING • 
(:1.3.1.2) 
RADIATION TESTING OR ANALYSIS 
(:1.3.1.3) 
PERFORM INITIAL SURN·IN AT 100h 
(:1.3.1.4) 
PERFORMANCE TEST ( :1.3.1.:I) 
STRESS TEST ( 5.31.6) 





STRESS TEST ( 5 3 1.8 l 




ASSIGN MAINTENANCE INTERVAL 
(:1.2.1) 
AGE COMPONENT TO COMPONENT 
QUALIFIED LIFE (:1.3.1.1) 
AGED COMPONENTS 
* Any failure requires analysis to determine origin: common mode or random, repair, redesign, or retest, or both, 
using aged components as required. · 
Figure 4.7 "Qualification Flowchart for Class lE 
Chargers & Inverters" 
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4.2.3.3 Inverters 
An inverter converts de power to ac power. on Nuclear 
Power Plants emergency ac power is typically required for 
the Reactor. Protection System, Feedwater System control, 
and Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries [48]. 
Four types of Inverter are commonly used: - the ferro-
resonant type which is used in about 50% of American 
Nuclear facilities, the. pu'lse-width modulated type, the 
quasi square wave, and the step wave type. The different 
types represent changes in the output requirements for 
inverters as the input requirements for computer equipment 
becomes more stringent (49] 
Class lE inverters are made to the same qualification 
program as Class lE Battery Chargers. 
4.2.3.4 Direct current Distribution Networks 
Components in the de distribution system are designed and 
rated as follows:-
1 Cables 
The positive and negative cables from the battery are 
run in separate conduits so that any insulation fault 
will cause an earth fault before a polarity to 
polarity fault. A polarity to polarity fault would 
cause serious damage as there is no short circuit 
protection in this circuit before the distribution 
panel. Cables are sized to carry the prospective 
48. Gi.nther,W.E., Subudhi,M.,and Taylor,J.H. "OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND AGING-SEISMIC 
ASSESSMENT OF BATTERY CHARGERS AND INVERTERS", NUREG/CR-4564, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Conmission, June 1986. Page 1-3 
49. Gi.nther,W.E., Subudhi,M.,and Taylor,J.H. "OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND AGING-SEISMIC 
ASSESSMENT OF BATTERY CHARGERS AND INVERTERS", NUREG/CR-4564, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Conmission, June 1986. Pages 2-10 and 2-16. 
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short circuit current and to keep the cable voltage 
drop acceptable even during start-up transients. A 
typical start-up transient would be a de motor in a 
valve actuator which can draw up to 11 times the 
normal load current when stalled. 
2 Protective devices 
Fuses and circuit breakers are rated to carry the 1 
minute battery discharge current but to trip at the 
battery short circuit current when the battery is at 
the minimum design state of charge. The battery 
protective device shall coordinate with the 
downstream protective devices. 
3 Loads Voltage ratings 
The de loads voltage ratings should be rated for the 
variation range of the battery terminal voltage. At 
Koeberg, the 125 Volt batteries float at 131 Volts, 
are equalized monthly for 40 hours at 134. 5 Volts, 
and the end-of-discharge voltage is 106.2 Volts. The 
de loads must therefore have an operating voltage 
rating of 125 Volts, + 10%, - 15% (taking the +/-1% 
tolerance of the battery charger voltage regulation 
into account.) 
4 Surge Suppression 
Highly inductive loads can generate large voltage 
surges when de-energized:- these should be suppressed 
or they could cause other de loads to malfunction. 
5 Constant Power loads. 
Inverters draw a constant power and the load current 
required is therefore inversely proportional to the 
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de input voltage. The battery should be sized to 
accommodate these loads. 
6 Battery Testing 
A discharge breaker is provided to allow convenient 
discharge.testing of the battery. 
7 Cross-ties between busses. 
Cross-ties between Class .. lE de busses are permitted 
when the new de source has sufficient capacity to 
accommodate the extra load. The new de source must 
not be in the redundant safety Division and must meet 
all the Class lE system .requirements. If a Class lE 
system is cross-connected to a non-safety battery, 
the continued operation of the Unit is not possible 
as the reliability of the Engineered Safety Features 
is degraded by the non-Qualified non-safety battery. 
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4.3 Summary 
The electric power supply system of a Nuclear Power Plant 
typically consists of:-
1. Two independent feeders from the Off-site grid 
network: - the one being the Generator transformer, 
and the other, the Auxiliary transformers. Under 
Normal operating conditions the Generator and 
Generator transformer • supply all station loads via 
the Unit Transformer. 
2. Two independent redundant Diesel Generator sets 
supplying Emergency power for the Engineered Safety 
Features if the grid network fails and the Generator 
fails to House Load. 
3. Lead-acid batteries supplying de power for:-
3 .1 Controlling the Breakers and Contactors in the 
station electrical network. 
3.2 Controlling the High Voltage yard switchgear. 
3.3 Controlling the Diesel Generator sets. 
3.4 The Reactor Protection Systems 
3.5 The Engineered Safety Feature control systems 
3.6 Controlling the Steam Turbine and Generator. 
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s. Trends in Electric Power Supply System Design 
The accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant 
caused a lot of introspection in the Nuclear industry. One 
of the areas that came under scrutiny was the Single 
Failure Criterion. The review of this lead to the 
increasing use of Probabilistic Risk Assessments as an 
improved indicator of plant safety. These Probabilistic 
Risk Assessments revealed that Station Blackout, that is, 
Loss of all ac power, was' a significant threat to the 
safety of many existing Nuclear Power Stations. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first 
discusses the review of the Single Failure Criterion, and 
the second describes the increasing use of Probabilistic 
Risk Assessments. The two major sections describe the 
improvements to the alternating and direct current systems 
at Nuclear Power Plants. The final section discusses 
Operator Error. 
5.1 The Review of the Single Failure Criterion. 
The Emergency electric power systems in Nuclear Power 
Plants are designed to meet the Single Failure Criterion. 
The loss of all ac or de power are events that are outside 
the Single Failure Criterion and as such have not been 
analyzed (50]. The loss of all ac or de power is possible 
from a Common mode failure. In the United states of 
America, the Advisory committee on Reactor Safeguards has 
been concerned· about these types of failure for over a 
decade and is not satisfied that the Single Failure 
Criterion is suitable design criterion for the Emergency 
Electric Power Supplies. The American Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has subsequently given a higher priority to the 
analysis of these loss of power scenarios. 
SO. Okrent,D. "NEW TRENDS IN SAFETY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS," IAEA·CN-39/6.4, Proc. Int. Conf. on 
Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues, IAEA, Stockholm, 20-24 October, 1980 
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5.2 The Use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
The use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis increased rapidly 
after the Three Mile Island accident. The Risk study done 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Auxiliary 
Feedwater systems at Three Mile Island and the resulting 
recommendations based on the risk study have made the 
industry realize the usefulness of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments can be used in existing 
plants as a safety review technique to identify plant that 
has a large contribution to the plant risk. In the design 
process for new plants, Probabilistic Risk Assessments can 
be used to enhance the reliability of new systems and it 
is expected that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will 
impose regulatory requirements that go beyond the Single 
Failure Criterion [51]. 
The use of Probabilistic Risk Assessments must be 
accompanied by a review of the results by a well qualified 
professional engineer whose speciality is Nuclear 
reliability and safety:- the partial failure of the 
reactor SCRAM at Browns Ferry Unit 3 in 1980 illustrates 
this. The Nuclear industry has analyzed the SCRAM function 
in detail, but one of the initiating events they assumed 
to be negligible was the one that caused the incident. 
Further investigation uncovered serious deficiencies in 
the SCRAM systems. Thus, the numbers produced by a 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments must be tempered by 
professional experience. 
51. Okrent,D. "NEW TRENDS IN SAFETY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS," IAEA·CN-39/6.4, Proc. Int. Conf. on 
Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues, IAEA, Stockholm, 20-24 October, 1980 
114 
5.3 Improvements to the ac power systems. 
The Nuclear industry has identified the loss of all ac 
power (both onsite and off-site) as a safety issue [52]. 
This is the so-called "Station Blackout" scenario. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments has been used extensively 
to analyze the reliability of the ac power systems and 
countries have responded in different ways to the results 
of these studies. 
5.3.1 The United States of America 
The frequency of occurrence and median duration for the 
loss of off-site power at American Nuclear Power Plants 
over the period from 1968 to 1983 is given [53]:-
Cause Number Frequency Median 
per site-year duration 
Plant centered 30 0.056 0.3 hours 
Grid blackout 10 0.019 0.7 hours 
Severe Storm 6 0.011 2.6 hours 
Totals 46 0.086 0.5 hours 
The off-site power loss typically has three causes:-
Plant-centered, Grid loss, and severe storms. (The number 
of site-years for this study was 533.) 
52. IColaczkowski,A.M., Payne,A.C. and Baranowsky,P.W. "ANALYSIS OF STATION BLACKOUT ACCIDENTS 
FOR LWR's", Proceedings of the International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety 
held at Chicago, IL l i noi s on August 29 • Septeni>er 2, 1982, Vo lune 1, NUREG/CP·D027·V1 
Part 2 of 2, page 511. 
53. Reisch,F. "COPING WITH STATION BLACKOUT", Nuclear Engineering International, Volune 30, 
no.375, October 1985, pages 48 to 51. 
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American Emergency Diesel Generator failure data for 
unplanned demands are [54):-
Year Demands Failures Failures/demand 
START PHASE 
1983 139 0 0.000/demand 
1984 124 1 0.008/demand 
1983 168 ; 1 0.006/demand 
. 
LOAD-RUN PHASE 
1983 68 1 0.015/demand 
1984 72 1 0.014/demand 
1983 83 2 0.024/demand 
3-YEAR DEMAND UNRELIABILITY 0.022/demand 
Over the three years there were 22104 planned and 
unplanned Diesel start demands: - the 4 31 unplanned start 
demands are few in comparison. The data for unplanned 
demands is sparse and this reduces the confidence level of 
the statistics. 
54 Wyckoff,H. "THE RELIABILITY OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS AT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS", 
NSAC-108, Electric Power Research Institute, California, September, 1986. 
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A study sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
found that there were no dominant diesel generator failure 
modes (1976 to 1980 data). However, three failure modes 
accounted for about 17% of all diesel generator failures 
[55):-
1. Dirt and moisture on relays and switches 
2. Contaminated oil in the diesel speed governor and 
governor setpoint error. 
3. Moisture in the air-sta~t system. 
Newer studies show a slightly different picture (56). 
Problems with the governor accounts for about 20% of 
diesel failures, while each of the following systems 
accounts for about 10% of the diesel failures:- engine 
mechanical, cooling, lubrication, electric power 
(including generator), and instrument & control. 
Although the onsite and off-site failures are independent, 
if they do occur simultaneously, then the impact is 
significant. Up to 1983, five Station Blackouts were 
experienced, and the longest was for 25 minutes [ 57]. 
The American Nuclear Regulatory Commission has identified 
Station Blackout as an Unresolved Safety Issue and is in 
the process of issuing a final rule. The objective of the 
rule is to reduce the risk of severe accidents occurring 
55. Battle,R.E., C&ff¢ell,D.J. and Baranowsky,P.W. 11RELIAB1LITY OF THE EMERGENCY AC POWER 
SYSTEM AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS." Proceedings of the International Meeting on Thermal 
Nuclear Reactor Safety held at Chicago, Illinois on August 29 • September 2, 1982, Volune 
1, NUREG/CP·0027·V1 Part 2 of 2. 
56 Wyckoff,H. 11THE RELIABILITY OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS AT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS", 
NSAC-108, Electric Power Research Institute, California, September, 1986. 
57. Berger,W. and Hanmersley,R. 11COPING WITH THE NUCLEAR STATION BLACKCXJT RULE CCXJLD PROVE 
EXPENSIVE", Power Engineering (USA), Volune 91, no.1, January 1987, pages 21. 
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as a result of station Blackout. Three areas are to be 
addressed (58]:-
1. Maintaining the high reliability of the electric 
power systems. 
2. Developing procedures and training for dealing with 
all possible causes of Station Blackout. 
3. Ascertaining that each individual plant can cope with 
a Blackout for an acceptable period of time. 
Point three can be determined from Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments. For example, one Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (59] indicates that the probability of total 
core failure is between 10-5 and 10-4 per reactor-year. 
The actual probability of a release of radioactivity to 
the environment is dependant on the type of Containment 
used. This Risk Assessment 
of primary coolant at the 
the short service times 
important contributors to 
Station Blackout. 
also indicates that the leakage 
Reactor Coolant Pump seals and 
of the de power sources are 
core damage as a result of 
The length of time a Nuclear Power Station can sustain a 
Station Blackout is dependant on the plant equipment 
design. Should a particular plant's Blackout coping time 
be less than the time determined by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, then significant costs could be incurred in 
upgrading the station hardware. The estimated costs are 
from $200 ooo to $4 million (60). The recommended Blackout 
58. Berger,W. and Hanmersley,R. "COPING WITH THE NUCLEAR STATION BLACKCXJT RULE CCXJLO PROVE 
EXPENSIVE", Power Engineering (USA), Vol1111e 91, no.1, January 1987, page 22. 
59. Kolaczkowski,A.M., Payne,A.C. and Baranowsky,P.W. "ANALYSIS OF STATION BLACKCXJT ACCIDENTS 
FOR LWR's", Proceedings of the International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety 
held at Chicago, ll l inoi s on August 29 - Septeri>er 2, 1982, Vol1111e 1, NUREG/CP·0027-V1 
Part 2 of 2, page 514. 
60. NUREG-1109 "Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety issue A·44, 
Station Blackout", draft, January 1986 (referenced in Berger,W. and Hanmersley,R. "COPING 
WITH THE NUCLEAR STATION BLACKCXJT RULE CCXJLO PROVE EXPENSIVE", Power Engineering (USA), 
Volune 91, no.1, January 1987.) 
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Coping time is from 4 to 16 hours, depending on station 
type [61]. 
Thus, the American response to the station Blackout hazard 
is to firstly, for each plant, quantify the station's 
Blackout Coping time. Should this be less than the 
stations specified Coping time (as laid down by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for different Emergency 
Electric Power system configurations), then the utility 
has two options [62]:-
1. To upgrade the equipment required to cope with a 
Station Blackout, that is, the de power systems, 
emergency feedwater storage tank, instrument 
compressed air, the reactor coolant pump seal 
integrity without cooling, and the decay heat removal 
systems that are independent of ac power. 
2. To upgrade the plant's ac power system configuration 
so that the increased reliability results in the 
plant complying with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Station Blackout requirements. Typical 
modifications here are to add an independent power 
line or an extra emergency Emergency Diesel generator 
set. 
61. Rei sch, F. "COPING WITH STATION BLACKOUT", Nuc Lear Engineering International, Vo lune 30, 
no.375, October 1985, pages 48 to 51. 
62 Berger,W. and Hanmersley,R. "COPING WITH THE NUCLEAR STATION BLACKOUT RULE COULD PROVE 
EXPENSIVE", Power Engineering (USA), Volune 91, no.1, January 1987. 
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5.3.2 France 
The French have used Diesel Generators on all their 900 MW 
Nuclear power units which number in excess of twenty (63]. 
The French Nuclear Power Stations were not designed to 
cope with Station Blackout initially as the event has a 
low probability of occurring (64]. They have subsequently 
identified two problems:-
1. The Reactor Primary System will lose Coolant from the 
Reactor Coolant Pump Seals and will result in the 
reactor core being uncovered. The uncovering of the 
core is a serious event as the Primary Fission 
Product Barrier, the Fuel Rod Cladding will rupture. 
The Secondary Fission Product Barrier, the Primary 
System, is already ruptured at the Primary Coolant 
Pump seals, and the only remaining Barrier is the 
Containment Building. 
2. The de system batteries can only supply the reactor 
instrumentation and controls for a limited time, 
thereafter, there will be no information on the 
reactor state. 
The French have implemented a number of counter measures 
to reduce the probability of core damage resulting from a 
Station Blackout (65]. The Reactor Coolant Pump seal 
leakage is identified as a small Loss of Coolant Accident 
and a special system, labelled the LLS system, is 
installed to provide seal water (Figure 5.1). 
63. Electricite de France. "EDF 900 MWe NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, SHORT TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION • 11 
issued by Service d'Equipment Nucleaire Exterieur, 11-13 Avenue de Friedland, 75008 
PARIS, May 1983. 
64. Melcot,B. "HOW EdF BRINGS ITS PWRs TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN DURING BLACICOOT", Nuclear 
Engineering International, Volune 32, no.394, May 1987, pages 55-6. 
65. Melcot,B. "HOW EdF BRINGS ITS PWRs TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN DURING BLACICOOT", Nuclear 
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121 
RCS . 
The LLS system has a small 380 Vac turbine driven 
generator supplied with steam from the steam generators. 
This ac power is used to drive a high pressure pump which 
forces water into the Reactor Coolant Pump seals and 
prevents a small Loss of Coolant Accident. The ac power is 
also used to supply other loads such as:- the lighting in 
the Unit control rooms, selected vital instrumentation, 
and the control system of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. 
Certain batteries are also charged with this power [66). 
The French have developed an -operating procedure "HJ II to 
keep the plant in a safe shutdown state for a few hours 
until the ac power can pe restored. 
The sequence of events covered. by the procedure 11 H3 11 are:-
following a Station Blackout, the Reactor Protection 
System trips the reactor and the Control rods drop into 
the core terminating the Nuclear Fission process. The 
reactor coolant continues circulating even though the 
Coolant Pumps are not operating. The thermal gradient 
between the reactor core and the steam generator provides 
the motive force for this "natural circulation". 
The heat is removed from the Steam Generators by the 
Auxiliary Feedwater system supplying water to the steam 
generator inlets: - the resulting steam is vented to the 
atmosphere. 
At the same time, the LLS system is preventing any 
significant leakage at the Reactor Coolant pump seals. 
Once the Primary system has been cooled down to 150 deg.C 
and the pressure is lower than 3 o Bar, the need for the 
Pump seal water falls away. 
66. Electricite de France, "PWR PLANT BLACKOUT, EDF'S RESPONSE", written by M.M.Gelle, 
Engineering and Construction Division, January 1988. 
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The LLS system also provides power for the instrumentation 
that the Operators need to use to maintain the "Natural 
Circulation". 
The procedure covers the restoration of power from an on-
site power source. Ac power sources available are:-
1. The main off-site power source. 
2. The Auxiliary off-site power source. 
J. The Train (Division) A ~iesel generator set. 
4. The Train (Division) B diesel generator set. 
5. Another Unit running on house load. All French sites 
have more than one Unit. 
6. A transportable gas turbo-generator kept at each site 
especially for Station Bl~ckouts. 
7. The last resort would be to take power from a Diesel 
Generator set in another Unit at the same site. 
A "Fish plate cabinet" is provided to implement the 
interconnections described in points 6 and 7 above. Figure 
5. 2 shows the single line diagram. Thus the gas turbo-
generator can be connected to any Safety related Diesel 
switchboard on the site, or any Diesel-generator can 
supply any other Diesel-generator switchboard. This is a 
last resort because the independence of the Safety 
Divisions is breached by the interconnection between them. 
The French actually tested out their procedure and 
Blackout equipment by deliberately causing a Station 
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Figure 5.2 "Fish Plate cabinet used to connect external 
generator, or to interconnect unit diesels" 
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5.3.3 Britain 
In Britain, the Sizewell B design has two Auxiliary 
Feedwater pumps driven by steam, and two Primary system 
charging pumps also driven by steam (67]. There are also 
two electrically driven pumps in each of these systems. 
The use of steam to power Engineered Safety System loads 
is to reduce the dependance · on ac electric power:- thus 
reducing the impact of a Station Blackout. The steam 
driven charging pumps provide the same function as the LLS 
system of the French stations~ 
The CEGB has used gas turbines to drive the Emergency 
power supply generators at two of its Nuclear Power 
Stations (68]. The original r~ason for using gas-turbines 
was that they were supposed to be more reliable than 
Diesel engines. However, experience has shown that the 
number of failures per start attempt for gas turbines is 
about twice that of diesel engines. 
Diesel generators are used at Sizewell B, and there are 
four diesel generators instead of. the usual two [ 69] • The 
diesels are positioned at two separate locations ensuring 
physical independence. 
The station batteries at Sizewell B have a 12 hour supply 
capability and two small diesel generators are provided 
for battery charging (70]. The diesel generators make the 
de power independent of a Station Blackout. 
67. Reisch,F. "COPING WITH STATION BLACKOUT", Nuclear Engineering International, Voll.Ille 30, 
no.375, October 1985, pages 48 to 51. 
68. CASTLE,J.R. "INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR CEGB GAS COOLED REACTORS ON 
DESIGN OF THEIR ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY SYSTEMS." IEE Proceedings C (Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution), Voll.Ille 128, no.2, pages 117-21, March 1981. 
69. George,B.V. "THE DESIGN OF THE PWR TO MEET UK REQUIREMENTS", The Nuclear Engineer, Voll.Ille 
25, No.5, Sept/Oct 1984, pp. 176 to 180. 
70. Rei sch, F. "COPING WITH STATION BLACKOUT", Nuclear Engineering International, Voll.Ille 30, 
no.375, October 1985, pages 48 to 51. 
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Essentially, at sizewell B, there is a four-way redundancy 
for systems required for shutting the plant down from 
power operating conditions, and a two-way redundancy for 
systems used when the unit is shut down for refuelling. 
5.3.4 Europe 
In FR Germany, the older plants usually have two redundant 
trains, whil.e the newer pla'.nts have four (] • The single 
failure criterion is met by an¥ three of the trains so the 
remaining train can be tested and maintained at any time. 
The German standard concept for the Electric Power 
supplies is shown in Figure 5.3. 
The Emergency Feedwater Systems and the Emergency Core 
Cooling Systems are located in a separate emergency 
building which also contains the diesel generators 
required for these Engineered Safety Features. The reason 
for the separate protected building is that the German 
Safety Guidelines require the safe shutdown and cooling of 
the reactor even when the Nuclear Auxiliary building has 
been destroyed by earthquakes, missiles or gas explosions. 
In addition, most of the loads in the new German plants 
are provided with duplicate supplies to further improve 
the power supply reliability. 
In Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, additional diesel 
driven feedwater pumps have been provided (72]. These are 
located in a special building some distance from the 
reactor building. 
71. Simon,M. "REDUNDANCY PROVES ITS WORTH IN FR GERMANY," Nuclear Engineering International, 
Vollllle 32, no.394, May 1987, pages 57. 
72. Reisch,F. "COPING WITH STATION BLACKOUT", Nuclear Engineering International, Vollllle 30, 
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5.3.5 South Africa 
In South Africa, ESKOM follows the French Nuclear program 
closely:- ESKOM reviews all plant modifications 
implemented by the French for applicability to Koeberg 
Nuclear Power Station. Thus, ESKOM has a Blackout Working 
Party and the author sat in this Working party for a time. 
The Blackout Working Party commissioned the ESKOM 
corporate Probabilistic RisR Assessment group to perform a 
Probabilistic Risk assessmen~ for Station Blackout at 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station [73]. The results indicate 
that Koeberg meets the Atomic Energy Corporations 
requirements as laid down in the LBGl document [74]. 
A recommendation of the Risk study is that Medium Voltage 
Breakers have the manual closing facility re-installed (it 
was removed at ESKOM's request when the station was 
built). The Risk study ignored the effect of battery 
failure and assumed that in the event of battery failure, 
the Medium Voltage Breakers could be opened and closed 
manually. 
The study indicates that the Unit trip is a significant 
initiating event for a Station Blackout and the 
recommendation here is that Unit trips be reduced. The 
success rate of House loading is also an important factor 
and the recommendation is that this is tested to maintain 
a high success rate. 
At present, Koeberg has none of the French Blackout 
modifications in place and the above study addresses the 
present plant state. The ESKOM Blackout committee is 
73. ESKOM, Nuclear Engineering Division, Report 1124602 "Loss of Electric Power Supplies", 
March 1989. 
74. Atomic Energy Board of South Africa "LICENSING OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT", docunent no. LBG/1, issue 3, May 1979. 
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therefore of the opinion that no further modifications are 
necessary. 
The author believes that the French Blackout modifications 
are well thought out, and their implementation at Koeberg 
will require minimal extra plant as an extra Diesel 
Generator is already installed along with a special 
switchboard that can connect the extra Diesel to any of 
the four Emergency Medium Voltage switchboards. 
The only extra equipment required is the LLS turbo-
generator and the Low Voltage LLS switchboard. The re-
supply of a Blackout Unit from a houseloaded unit via the 
High Voltage Switchyard is essentially covered by a 
procedure, while the last resort of breaching the Safety 
System independence by connecting a Emergency Diesel from 
another unit to the Emergency busbars of the Blackout Unit 
is achieved by overiding the interlocks on the extra 
Diesel switchboard. All these actions need to be covered 
by a procedure which could be based on the French H3 
procedure. 
The advantage of installing the LLS turbo-generator is 
that in the event of a Blackout, the Primary pump seals 
will not be damaged immediately. The commercial 
implications are that once the cause of the Blackout has 
been rectified, the Unit can return to operation if the 
power was restored before any Primary Pump Seal damage 
occurred. 
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5,4 Improvements to the de power systems. 
The main components in the de power systems are:-
batteries, battery chargers, inverters, and the de power 
distribution system. 
5.4.1 Batteries 
A study sponsored py the_Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 
the United States of America to evaluate the use of lead-
acid batteries in Nuclear Power Plants found several 
issues affecting the life of cells [75]. 
The most common age-related stress mechanism in lead-acid 
cells using lead-calcium alloys is the corrosion of grids 
in the plates and the corrosion of the top conductors. The 
acid corrodes the lead to lead-dioxide which causes a 21% 
volume growth:- this leads to a number of failure modes. 
1. The grids in the plate swell and can cause poor 
contact between the grid and the active material in 
the plate. 
2. The plates may swell to such an extent that the 
container cracks:- a cell without electrolyte is 
useless. 
The corrosion of the lead is enhanced by high temperatures 
which can result from overcharging, a high current ripple 
in the cell, or high ambient temperatures. An increase in 
ambient temperature from 25 deg.C to 35 deg.C can reduce 
the cell life by as much as 50%. 
75. Edson,J.L. and Hardin,J.E. "AGING OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES IN SAFETY SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR 
POIJER PLANTS," NUREG/CR·4457, United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, July 1987, 
page 30. 
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The problem with cells that are weakened by this swelling 
and weakening is that they may still be able to supply 
their design power but the seismic withstand capability 
may be seriously impaired. Tests on old batteries have 
confirmed this. Thus the latest revision of IEEE Std 535-
1986 "IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class lE Lead 
Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" 
requires that seismic qualification take place with aged 
cells. Some manufacturers have qualified their new range 
of cells to 15 years. 
Operating experience in the United States of America 
indicates that:-
1. Low Specific Gravity of . cells accounted for 27% of 
the battery-related events reported to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
2. Errors by personnel in operating, maintaining and 
testing batteries accounted for 21% of the battery-
related events reported to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
3. Wearout failure of cells peaks between 6 and 11 years 
of operation 
The implication of the above points is that lead-acid 
cells are not being looked after as well as they should 
be. Low Specific Gravity can only occur if the cell 
terminal voltage is incorrect and the cell is discharging. 
The large number of personnel errors indicates an under-
estimation of the care needed to ensure long cell life:-
the early fail~res could be a result of the lack of care 
in maintaining and operating the cells. 
Thus there is a need to develop better techniques of 
monitoring the state of lead-acid cells in Nuclear Power 
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Plants, particularly cell state of charge, and the Seismic 
withstand ability of old cells. 
In 1986 the author was part of a literature. search 
conducted by the Design & Specification Group at Koeberg 
Nuclear Power station. The aim was to find useful papers 
and articles on lead acid batteries. One of the most 
useful papers found, in the author's opinion, is one by 
D.Berndt of VARTA Batterie AG (76]. 
The state of charge of cells on float charge is not easy 
to determine as the only true indicator of cell state of 
charge is a qualification discharge. The use of the cell 
Specific Gravity is problematic as discussed previously. 
Berndt proposes a statistical method that evaluates the 
whole battery of cells. The cell terminal voltages are 
measured with the battery at Float charge conditions and 
the distribution is plotted. Figure 5.4 shows the 
distribution for over 300 cells in 12 batteries used by 
the German Federal Postal Administration. The terminal 
voltages have a Normal Distribution with a Standard 
deviation of 4 mv. 
If one cell was faulty then it would show up on the Normal 
Distribution as being outside the Normal Distribution. 
Berndt also puts forward that if several cells were 
outside the Normal Distribution, then the battery as a 
whole is not fully charged. 
The use of Specific Gravity measurements is only needed to 
investigate weak cells because the acid density cannot 
fall while the cell terminal voltage is correct. 
76. Berndt,D. "STATIONARY LEAD ACID BATTERIES, OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS, FUTURE ASPECTS," 
presented at Syq:>osiun on Standby & Uninterruptable Power Supplies, organized by South 
African Institute of Electrical Engineers and The Association of Municipal Electricity 
Undertakings of South Africa, 17 to 18 Septed:>er 1986, paper 11. 
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The IEEE recommended maintenance is not as sophisticated 
as this and the author expects many users of batteries to 
utilize Berndt's method because it is so simple and gives 
information about individual cells and the battery as a 
whole~ 
Interestingly, Berndt goes on to describe sealed lead-acid 
cells. He concludes that due to the cell internal 
processes, the simple method proposed above cannot be used 
to monitor the state of cha~ge of sealed lead acid cells. 
As the cells are sealed, no Specific Gravity measurements 
are possible, and the only way to test sealed cells is to 
discharge them. Thus,· the use of sealed cells is not 
possible in Nuclear plants, unless two battery banks are 
used so that each can be discharged periodically while the 
other supports the loads. 
The use of Lead-acid batteries has had a long and involved 
history at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station [77]. After the 
initial installation of the batteries in 1982, some 
problems were experienced with cells not being properly 
charged. Near the end of 1982, certain cells were still 
undercharged, and the float voltage was increased from 
2. 20 V/cell to 2. 22 V/cell. Electricite de France in 
France were experiencing similar problems at the time. 
The batteries did not recover and in mid 1983, a large 
number of batteries failed their discharge tests. The 
Contractor replaced cells and the batteries were 
eventually fit for use in 1984 when the Unit was started 
up for the first time. 
In early 1985, during a forced outage, several batteries 
failed their discharge tests and new cells were ordered 
from France. 
n. Morley,M "KOEBERG BATTERIES", KOEBERG COll1)Uter Reference 201124R, 28 October 1986. 
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In mid 1985, it came to light that Electricite de France 
were replacing certain batteries after as little as 3 
years and they had a general policy to replace all cells 
after 5 years. 
The author's involvement started in July 1986 when a 
Battery Working Group was formed to address a number of 
issues:-
1. The effect of temperature on cell life. 
2. The effect of current ripple on cell life. 
3. The advisability of deep dischargrs. 
4. The suitability of the battery charging regime. 
5. The world experience with lead-acid batteries. 
1. Temperature 
A higher temperature increases the cell capacity and 
corrosion rate, and lowers the cell open-circuit voltage 
(78]. Typically, an increase in temperature from 20 deg.C 
to 30 deg.C halves battery life (79]. 
2. Current Ripple 
Excessive current ripple through a Lead-acid battery 
results in a loss of life: - the analogy is that every 
cycle of the ripple is a small charge-discharge cycle. As 
a lead-acid battery only has a finite number of full 
charge-discharge cycles, the cumulative effect of the 
ripple charge-discharge cycles is a loss of life. Current 
ripple can cause extra heating of cells which accelerates 
the loss of electrolyte. At Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, 
the specified maximum ripple is 5% of the Ampere-hour 
78. "THE WILLARD STORAGE BATTERY", Willard, P.O.Box 4025, Port Elizabeth, 6014, RSA, Form 
6750, April 1982. 
79. Boettger,K., Engineer, AEG c~ny, verbal c011111Jnication, 1986. 
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rate, that is, SO Amperes for a 1000 Amp-hour battery 
[80]. Measurements of the ripple current indicate that the 
actual ripple currents at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station 
are less than 1% of the battery Ampere-hour -rates:-
batteries feeding inverters have a slightly higher figure 
of 3%. 
3. Magnitude of Maintenance Discharges 
A one-hour discharge test is used to qualify the batteries 
for service at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. (The 
batteries are designed to supply the de loads for one hour 
at the minimum temperature of 15 deg.C). This discharge is 
roughly 30% of the battery. capacity. The effect of 
discharges of different magnitude was investigated with 
respect to battery life. 
The disadvantages of deep discharges are that these use up 
some of the batteries finite number of charge-discharge 
cycles. The advantage of deep discharges is that it 
reduces the amount of rhombic Lead-dioxide in the Positive 
plate by converting it to tetragonal Lead-dioxide [81]. 
The significance of this is that the tetragonal form has a 
specific weight capacity which exceeds that of the rhombic 
form by 150 to 300%. The tetragonal form has a lower self 
discharge rate due to its lower final charge potential. 
Thus, in float charge applications, the occasional deep 
discharge of lead-acid batteries is beneficial as the 
impact on the finite number of charge-discharge cycles is 
small, and the capacity of the positive plate is 
maintained. 
80. Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Specification for Lead-acid Batteries, Ref. Maintenance 
Manual 315 "LEAD ACID BATTERIES". 
81. Dasoyan, M.A. and Aguf, I.A. "CURRENT THEORY OF LEAD ACID BATTERIES", Technicopy, 
Stonehouse, England, 1979 pages 146 to 165. 
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4. Battery Charging 
The battery charging regime consists of a float voltage 
with a monthly equalizing charge. The float voltage is 
2.22 V/cell and the equalizing voltage is 2.28 V/cell. 
Initially the equalizing charge was for 18 hours, but this 
was increased to 40 hours in 1986 to combat the gradual 
discharge of the batteries. 
This did improve the bat~ery performance on float charge, 
however, many batteries were approaching their fifth year 
of operation and the decision was taken to replace all old 
batteries on Unit 1. These batteries had not had the best 
commissioning and had been undercharged at 2. 20 V/cell 
[82]:- this can lead to s~lphation and low specific 
gravities. High electrolyte concentrations can speed up 
the self discharge process and result in undercharging 
[83]. There is evidence that this may have occurred in 
some of the cells at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station [84]. 
The Unit 2 batteries had been commissioned with more care 
and some of these have given six years operation before 
being replaced. 
The current policy for Unit outages is to perform a 10 
hour deep discharge test and then Boost charge the 
batteries to 2.6 V/cell. This has to be done off-load as 
the de system loads are not rated for these high voltages. 
As the Unit outages occur yearly, this Boost charge can 
only happen yearly. 
82. ESKOM Surveillance Report RSV/86/002/VD/927, Koeberg Nuclear Power Station C~ter Ref. 
192341R, dated 18 July 1986. 
83. Dasoyan, M.A. and Aguf, I .A. "CURRENT THEORY OF LEAD ACID BATTERIES", Technicopy, 
Stonehouse, England, 1979 page 346. 
84. ESKOM Memorand1.111 from Engineering Investigations Manager to Power Station Manager, 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Ref. OT243,Acc.No,309590, dated 23 April 1987. 
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A flowchart (Figure 5. 5) has been developed to allow a 
battery that fails the one hour qualification test to be 
"cycled". This cycling is done to re-form the active 
material on the plates and to remove any sulphation. 
Boost charging at 2.6 V/cell has the additional advantage 
of circulating the electrolyte which eliminates any 
stratification of the electrolyte. With this in mind, 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station has specified air 
electrolyte agitators for, arl new cells:- this is expected 
to increase the life of the batteries as the charging is 
more efficient when the electrolyte is stirred. 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station has built a "Battery 
Hospital" which is essentially. a suitably ventilated room 
with a large automated battery charger. The "Battery 
Hospital" is used to commission new battery banks for 
installation during outages:- this ensures a properly 
commissioned battery as there is plenty of time to form 
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5. World Experience 
The author produced an ESKOM report on "Representative 
Stationary Battery Experience" in September 1987 [85). The 
purpose of the report is to provide a summary of the 
operational experience gained by various stationary 
battery users in North America and Europe. 
The USA and Canadian experience with stationary lead acid 
batteries is summarized as follows [86):-
1. Most applications rely on the use of pasted alloy 
plate cells. 
2. Operating restrictions require careful control of 
charging voltage, battery environment, and purity of 
water and sulphuric acid. 
3. The relatively low frequency of power failures and 
the use of emergency diesel generators result in 
infrequent and short discharges for most cells. 
4. Cell failure at old age is usually related to a small 
number of mechanisms, most often involving corrosion 
or sulphation. 
5. Many cell failures result from misuse or abuse during 
installation or operation. 
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85. Smyth, T .P. "Representative Stationary Battery Experience", Design & Specification Group, 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Report DSG-550-002, Sept 1987. 
86. Frieanan E J et al "ELECTROTECHNOLOGY VOL 3, Stationary Lead acid Batteries, 
"Applications and Performance", Ann Arbor Science Publishers Inc;, Michigan, 1980 
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8. Subtle changes in cell design, fabrication, materials 
or operation can have considerable impact on 
performance. 
9. The Bell survey clearly indicates three classes of 
cell performance (a) those of short life (7 years); 
(b) those of moderate life (11 years); and (c) those 
of long life (greater than 15 years). 
10. Proper selection of initial, float and equalization 
voltage have a strong influence on cell operation and 
life. 
11. Calcium alloy cells ai-e most often chosen for 
applications where infrequent discharges are 
expected. Tubular or Plante cells are chosen for 
less reliable circumstances. 
12. Strict maintenance, monitoring and reporting 
procedures are required for batteries used in 
critical de systems in Nuclear power facilities. 
The British Post Office uses Plante cells and since 1972, 
emergency batteries have not been used as a filtering 
element for the battery charger:- filtering is more 
economically provided by capacitors integrated into the 
module. The batteries are found to be more reliable on 
float charge when they are not used as a filtering 
element. 
The float voltage is carefully selected and provided by a 
well-filtered charger:- the cell plates do not corrode, no 
equalizing charge is needed and the cell condition is 
gauged from the colour of the cell electrodes. 
Cell maintenance comprises of a float voltage measurement, 
electrolyte level correction and electrode colour 
examination. 
The CEGB use Plante cells in all their power plants and 
obtain a service life of 25 years in Nuclear plants. As no 
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discharge tests are possible during Nuclear plant 
operation, only specific gravity measurements and visual 
inspections are done. 
Future plants will, however, use tubular cells as they are 
more economic and the installation will have a redundant 
capacity in excess of 100%. 
The Swiss Post office uses tubular cells and has carefully 
optimized the cell floatin~ voltage. This regime 
eliminates equalizing charges and periodic discharge/ 
charge cycles: a cell life of 15 years can be expected. 
Swiss Nuclear plants use both plants and tubular cells and 
have achieved battery lifes of 10 and 9 years 
respectively. The cell manufacturers are involved in the 
battery maintenance and the manufacturer Electrona suggest 
a cell life of up to 19 years when used with a very well 
filtered battery charger. 
The West German Post off ice use both Plante and tubular 
cells and expects 15 years of service from both types. 
The West German Nuclear plants use mainly Plante cell 
types and achieve 20 years battery lifetimes. Batteries 
are equalized annually at 2.6 to 2.7 V/Cell and the cells 
are dismantled and cleaned annually. 
room temperature is 15 deg.c. 
The average battery 
The French experience is summarized as:-
"The life of the Plante batteries is at least 20 years, 
while the Ironclad (tubular) lead batteries have much 
shorter lives. The Ironclad batteries, with higher 
capacity than the Plante, have shown faster corrosion, 
particularly for those units installed since 1960. Those 
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units coupled with inverters have corroded at a much 
faster rate. This aging phenomenon is characterized by a 
substantial loss of capacity. The discharge curves 
significantly decrease below the minimum value specified 
by the manufacturers". 
"In addition to the normal aging, the lead-acid batteries 
have shown frequent corrosion on the top of the plates, 
resulting in a slow reduction in the size of their cross 
sections. Fracturing of the plates has also occurred. 
It should be noted that these failures did not seem to 
occur on all cells of the same battery, even though they 
are all subjected to the same charge and discharge 
currents and are in the same environment. These failures 
are very serious because they pccur without any warning or 
apparent visual signs or changes in characteristics, eg. 
specific gravity". 
"In summary, the two years of observations and analysis 
indicate that the corrosion of the cells occurs where 
perchlorate ions are formed. The analysis also shows that 
the corrosion is more pronounced when an inverter is part 
of the circuit"'[87]. 
The American and European usage and trends of Lead-acid 
cells is summarized in Figure 5.6 [88):-
87. Friednan E J et al "ELECTROTECHNOLOGY VOL 3, Stationary Lead acid Batteries, 
"Applications and Performance", Am Arbor Science Publishers Inc;, Michigan, 1980 
88. Friednan E J et al 11ELECTROTECHNOLOGY VOL 3, Stationary Lead acid Batteries, 
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5.4.2 Battery Chargers and Inverters 
An assessment of the aging of battery chargers and 
inverters used in Nuclear Power Plants was prepared for 
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (89). 
The most significant problem in the design of chargers and 
inverters is the use of electrolytic and oil-filled 
capacitors. Plant failure histories as reported to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission show that these types of 
capacitor have a useful life gf 4 to 6 years. The report 
recommends the use of capacito~s with higher voltage and 
temperature ratings to reduce the stress on the component. 
Of note is that the Pulse-width modulation type of 
inverter uses a smaller filtering capacitor and may not be 
as susceptible to capacitor failure. 
Other design and fabrication issues are:-
1. The use of surge suppression equipment is essential 
on the inputs to chargers and inverters. 
2. The use of natural convection cooling is not 
sufficient as many charger and inverter failures are 
attributed to overheating. The use of Forced Cooling 
is recommended. 
3. Zener reference diodes are not stable enough for use 
as voltage references. 
4. Transformer internal temperatures are higher than 
anticipated and the use of Class B insulation has 
resulted in premature transformer failures. The use 
of Class H insulation is recommended to ensure 
reliable service from Safety related transformers. 
89. Gunther,W.E., Subudhi,M.,and Taylor,J.H. "OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND AGING-SEISMIC 
ASSESSMENT OF BATTERY CHARGERS AND INVERTERS", NUREG/CR-4564, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Conmission, June 1986. 
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5. The detection of a battery charger failure on some 
plants only occurs when the low voltage alarm on the 
de busbars is activated:- when the battery is at the 
end of its useful discharge. This is undesirable. In 
France, one of the most serious incidents occurred in 
this way: - the charger on the main control battery 
failed and the battery gradually ran down without the 
operators being aware of it. The consequence was that 
the Engineered Safety Feature equipment was operating 
spuriously as the various control relays dropped out 
at random due to the -very low control voltage. A 
modification was installed to immediately detect 
charger output failure and to trip the switchboard in 
the event of the battery yoltage reaching the minimum 
board voltage: - no control at all is better than 
spurious, unpredictable action. 
The failure of battery chargers and especially inverters 
can have a significant impact on the plant:- for example, 
the reactor can trip, the safety injection systems can be 
actuated, or the Emergency Core Cooling Systems may be 
inhibited. 
For both the Reactor Protection System and the Emergency 
Core Cooling Systems the failure of inverters has the 
greatest contribution to the system unreliability. The 
failure of battery chargers is the third greatest 
contributor to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems 
unreliability. 
The testing of the Diesel Generator sets results in large 
voltage and frequency variations in the power applied to 
the battery chargers which stresses the charger components 
unnecessarily and could cause early failure. Battery 
chargers and inverters should be given additional 
attention during construction and commissioning to ensure 
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that they are not prematurely aged by electrical or 
physical stresses. 
The addition of a second battery charger which will 
significantly increase the reliability of the de systems. 
A typical example is shown in Figure 5.7 (90] :- Battery 
chargers 31 and 32 both supply battery number 3. However, 
to save costs, a common battery charger is shared between 
batteries 1 and 2 as the second charger. 
Plant data indicates that at. least 30% of charger and 
inverter failures are age related and a 
improvement in the equipment performance can 
reducing these failures. This is supported 
significant 
be made by 
by a more 
recent report [91]. Chargers ~nd inverters have a burn-in 
period of about 2 years operation and a wear-out period 
after 4 to 6 years operation. 
The ambient temperature of chargers or inverters has a 
"dramatic" effect on the reliability of the equipment:-
overheating is identified as a major contributor to aging 
related failures. Components affected included capacitors, 
transformers and semiconductors. 
The Seismic withstand capability of aged chargers and 
inverters is impaired in some instances by weak cabinet 
mountings, printed circuit board supports, connectors, and 
oil filled capacitors. 
A 12-year old Safety-related inverter and battery charger 
where tested for the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission [92]. The main assessment of the equipment 
90. Young,R.A. "ADDITIONAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS EMPLOYED AT DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR 
POWER PROJECT," IEEE Power Engineering Society SI.Imler Meeting (Text of A Papers), 
Portland, ORE, USA, 18·23 July 1976, pages A76 438·2/1·6. 
91. Muhlheim,M.D. and Murphy,G.A. 11CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 
POWER SUPPLY BUS FAILURES," Nuclear Safety, Volune 28, No.1, January· March 1987, pages 
90·7. 
92 Gunther,W.E. "TESTING OF A NATURALLY AGED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INVERTER AND BATTERY 





























































































































































































after testing, was that it had not aged substantially. The 
two main recommendations are:-
1. Temperatures of the internal panel as well . as key 
components be monitored to detect overheating:-
overheating usually precedes component failure. 
2. The inverter was tested with one or more of the input 
and output filter capacitors disconnected and was 
found to be functional. The report recommends that 
each capacitor be individually fused and alarmed:-
therefore the failure of one capacitor in the filter 
bank will not trip the inverter. The alarm signals 
the inspection of the remaining capacitors. 
Periodic testing is identified as a problem in some plants 
[93]:- only a few plants do capacity tests on their 
inverters and chargers. The importance of these items of 
equipment makes periodic testing essential. 
The documentation of failure causes is poor and could be 
because the maintenance staff are not familiar with the 
equipment or because time is limited. To improve the 
reliability of equipment, the failure modes are necessary. 
From the failure data available, personnel errors account 




improvement of operating and maintaining 
will improve the performance levels 
Thus, personnel training should be improved in the 
operating and maintenance arenas, and key components used 
in battery chargers and inverters should be subject to a 
regular performance testing to detect imminent failure. 
93 Gunther,W.E., Subudhi,M.,and Taylor,J.H. "OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND AGING·SEISMIC 
ASSESSMENT OF BATTERY CHARGERS AND INVERTERS", NUREG/CR·4564, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Conmission, June 1986. 
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Some of these tests could be done while the equipment is 
on load. Detailed guidelines for a Battery Charger and 
Inverter Maintenance program are given in a Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission study (94]. 
Failures of fast-acting fuses used in inverters and 
battery chargers to protect the semiconductors is a cause 
for concern. The failures are attributed to thermal 
stresses. This is to be investigated at a later stage and 
could have a significant inipact on Nuclear plants due to 
the extensive use of fuses in safety related electrical 
equipment. A recent paper indicates that fuse and breaker 
failures contribute 23% and 6% respectively to inverter 
failures [95]. 
To illustrate the performance of battery chargers and 
inverters, the failure distribution for the Vital 
Instrumentation & Control Power supplies are given. These 
power supplies have batteries, battery chargers and 
inverters to provide ac power (Figure 5.8). 
94 G1.nther,W.E., Lewis,R. and Subudhi,M. "DETECTING AND MITIGATING BATTERY CHARGER AND 
INVERTER AGING", NUREG/CR-5051, United States Nuclear Regulatory COl!lnission, August 1988. 
95 Muhlheim,M.D. and Murphy,G.A. "CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 
POWER SUPPLY BUS FAILURES," Nuclear Safety, Volume 28, No.1, January· March 1987, pages 
90-7 
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The main causes of Vital Instrumentation & Control Power 
Supply failure in the United States of America is inverter 
failure with human error a close second. The figures are 
[96]:-
Failure Mode Failure Distribution 
Inverter failures 43% 
Human Errors 35% 
; 
Battery Charger failures 7% 
.. 
Miscellaneous causes 15% 
The inverters are the most. complex equipment in the Vital 
Instrumentation & Control power supplies and these have 
the highest failure rate. The battery chargers are not as 
complex and have a better reliability. The batteries are 
the simplest of all and are not a significant cause of 
power supply failure. 
In West German Nuclear plants, the Vital Instrument and 
Control systems are powered by 2 4 Vol ts de and not the 
typical ac of French and American plants ( 97] • The 24 
Volts de is supplied by batteries and safety related 
inverters are therefore not required. This leads to an 
improvement in power supply reliability as there are fewer 
components in the power supply chain. 
96. Muhlheim,M.D. and Murphy,G.A. "CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 
POWER SUPPLY BUS FAILURES," Nuclear Safety, Voll.Ille 28, No.1, January· March 1987, pages 
90·7. 
97. Simon,M. "REDUNDANCY PROVES ITS WORTH IN FR GERMANY," Nuclear Engineering International, 
Voll.Ille 32, no.394, May 1987, pages 57. 
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5.4.3 Direct Current System Layout 
The Battery Working Group at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station 
met with representatives of the battery manufacturer and 
the main electrical contractor to discuss future 
maintenance and operation of the batteries. The proposals 
of the several Electricite de France power stations were 
discussed. 
The outcome of the discussions was that a Voltage-dropping 
diode system (as used on ~ESKOM's distribution sub-
stations) would be used on all batteries located away from 
the main plant at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. A 
schematic of this system is shown in Figure 5. 9: - the 
voltage monitor switches in _blocks of voltage dropping 
diodes to keep the load voltage constant when the input 
voltage is raised for Boost charging. Typical de systems 
are those in the Chlorine plant and the Demineralized 























































"ESKOM Voltage Dropping Diode System" 
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Direct current systems that are located inside the main 
plant (some are Safety related) are to be supplied from 
additional batteries which allow the system batteries to 
be Boost charged. The author played a significant.role in 
the development of this design. The schematic is shown in 
Figure 5.10:- the additional battery is the same size as 
the largest battery in the Division and voltage range, and 
can be switched so that it supplies the de system 
switchboard. The system battery can then be charged, or 
cycled if necessary, from the additional battery charger. 
The interconnections need to have mechanical interlocks to 
ensure the independence of the de systems. 
The author produced a cost benefit analysis for the 
modification [ 98 J and demonstrated that the modification 
offers a probable saving of R46 million for an initial 
outlay of R3.5 million. This is because a battery failure 
will not cause a forced outage as the de system can be 
supplied from the additional battery until the new battery 
is bought and commissioned. Without the modification, a 
failed safety related battery that has to flown out from 
France will result in a farced outage of at least three 
months. The loss of earnings from the sale of electricity 
for a single day amounts to over Rl million. 
The additional benefits are that a failed Safety Related 
battery has much less impact on the station safety. 
The·Voltage dropping diode system does not have the same 
cost benefit when applied to the main station batteries as 
the failure of a battery leads to a Forced Outage with the 
associated loss of electricity sales. 
At present, the decision to implement this modification at 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station has not been finalized. 
98. Smyth, T .P. "COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY BATTERY MOOIFICATION", Design & 
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"ESKOM Auxiliary Battery System" 
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5.5 Operator Error. 
The high incidence of Human Error leading to loss of power 
is cause for concern:- the systems should be designed in 
such a way as to minimize operator error. As a guide, 
typical figures used for Operator Error in Probabilistic 
Risk studies are [99]:-
Type of Operation Fraction of Operations 
; not completed Correctly 
• 
Complicated, non-routine 1 in 4 
Non-routine, other duties 1 in 10 
at same time. 
Routine, requires care 1 in 100 
Routine, simple 1 in 1000 
Simplest possible operation 1 in 10 000 
These figures apply to Normal operating conditions and the 
message is that the more complex the action, the higher 
the probability is that the operator will make a mistake. 
This is the reason the configuration of the de systems at 
Nuclear Power Plants are kept simple: - a complex 
interconnected system would result in more operating 
errors. 
There are two schools of thought on the way to increase 
the reliability of Nuclear Power Stations:- the one is to 
reduce the complexity and therefore the number of plant 
items, and the other, to add more redundant equipment to 
assure the functionality of the safety systems. 
99 IJhittingham,R.B. "HUMAN FACTORS IN RELIABILITY AND SAFETY • A PRAGMATIC APPROACH", 
Nuclear Safety and Reliability Assessment Course organized by the Atomic Energy 
Corporation of South Africa and the University of Cape Town, Pretoria, 24 June to 5 July, 
1985. 
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1. The first approach is illustrated by the Westinghouse 
Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor design [100]:- to 
increase the plant reliability, Westinghouse are 
altering the reference plant design wherever possible 
to simplify licensing, construction, operation, and 
maintenance. Thus, the building volume has been 
reduced by 55%, there are 60% fewer valves, 50% fewer 
large pumps, 60% less pipe, 50% less heat exchangers, 
and 80% fewer control cables. 
Furthermore, the plant .i.s passively safe, that is, 
the shutdown systems will carry out their functions 
indefinitely without any operator intervention. Fewer 
components coupled with a passively-safe design will 
lead to a more reliable. plant and to lower capital 
costs:- a 40% saving over present day plants is 
estimated. The cost is estimated to be $762 million 
for a 600MW (electric) plant. 
2. The second approach is illustrated by the British 
Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station:- instead of the 
usual two safety trains, the Sizewell B design calls 





pumps, six main feedwater pumps, four 
feedwater pumps, and four diesel 
The electrical network is complex as 
four independent safety trains and 
approximately twice as much equipment as in a two 
train plant. The Probabilistic Risk Assessments of 
the design indicate that the frequency of a large 
uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the 
environment is less than 10-7 per reactor per year. 
100. 11600-M\Je AP\JR FORECAST TO COST $762 MILLION," Nuclear News, October 1988. 
101. George,B.V. "THE DESIGN OF THE P\JR TO MEET UK REQUIREMENTS", The Nuclear Engineer, Vollllle 
25, No.5, Sept/Oct 1984, pp. 176 to 180. 
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Typical figures for Operator Error in Emergency situations 
are [102]:-
Time since incident Fraction of Opera·tions 
not completed Correctly 
Within 1 minute 1 in 1 
After 5 minutes 9 in 10 
After 30 minutes ; 1 in 10 
After some hours ~ 1 in 100 
The significance of these. figures is that an emergency 
situation at a Nuclear Power Station must be detected 
automatically. The necessary Engineered 
actions must be initiated automatically 
cannot be relied upon to make decisions 
minutes. 
Safety feature 
as the operator 
in the first 5 
102 Whittingham,R.B. "HUMAN FACTORS IN RELIABILITY AND SAFETY - A PRAGMATIC APPROACH", 
Nuclear Safety and Reliability Assessment Course organized by the Atomic Energy 
Corporation of South Africa and the University of Cape Town, Pretoria, 24 June to 5 July, 
1985. 
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5.6 Summary of Trends 
The trends noted in the Emergency electric power supply 
systems at PWR Nuclear Power Plants are:-
1. The use of Probabilistic Risk analysis is increasing 
as it provides quantitative information on design 
weaknesses. 
2. The main improvements to the ac power systems are to 
reduce the impact of a .. station Blackout. The main 
Station Blackout modifications are:-
2.1 The addition of an extra diesel generator or a 
gas turbo-generator •. 
2.2 The addition of equipment to protect the Primary 
pump seals. 
2. 3 For new plants, the Engineered Safety Features 
consist of four redundant Safety trains rather 
than the usual two of the older plants. 
3 . The improvements to the de power systems are to 
increase the reliability of power supply. The main 
areas of concern are:-
3. 1 Overheating of batteries leading to early 
failures. 
3. 2 Poor battery moni taring techniques leading to 
undercharged cells. 
3 . 3 Overheating of Battery chargers and Inverters 
leading to early failures. 
3. 4 The lack of periodic testing and monitoring of 
Battery chargers and Inverters. 
3.5 The large percentage of the 
Batteries, Battery chargers 




6. Recommendations for Utilities 
The information presented in the previous chapter is used 
to formulate recommendations for Existing Nuclear Power 
Plants, and for Future Nuclear Power Plants. The 
recommendations are written in a straight-forward manner 
in the interests of brevity and clarity. 
6.1 Actions for Existing Utilities 
Existing utilities should just4fy all modifications with a 
cost benefit analysis as it may be cheaper to improve the 
maintenance of equipment rather than to implement 
modifications. 
The recommendations for existing utilities resulting from 
the trends noted in the previous chapter are:-
6.1.1 Station Blackout 
The utility should perform a Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
to quantify the risk of a Station Blackout. The results of 
the study should indicate if and where any improvements 
are needed in the ac or de electric power systems. Typical 
modifications to the ac systems would be the addition of 
additional generating equipment like a diesel or steam 
driven generator. Modifications to the de systems could be 
extra battery chargers, or extra batteries. 
The utility should keep a history record of all failures 
of Engineered Safety Feature equipment and of the grid 
network so that the Risk Assessment can be validated from 
time to time. 
Once the mechanisms for coping with a Station Blackout are 
in place, a detailed procedure is necessary to minimize 
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operator error. For example, the French have a complete 
procedure "HJ" which covers their Blackout coping systems. 
6.1.2 Diesel Generators 
Utilities should pay particular attention to the 
maintenance of the engine governor as the failure of this 
item is the most significant of all diesel failure modes. 
6 .1. 3 Batteries 
High battery temperature caused by overcharging, high 
ripple current, or a high ambient temperature has a marked 
effect on battery life:- utilities should ensure that the 
battery chargers are tested regularly so that the 
batteries are correctly charged. The temperature of the 
battery rooms should be kept at or below 25 deg.C:- air 
conditioning should be installed if necessary. 
Operating history in the United States of America 
indicates that cells are not being maintained as well as 
they should be. The non-intrusive battery monitoring 
method proposed by Berndt should be used to monitor the 
condition of the batteries:- the need for maintenance will 
be determined by the battery condition. 
The initial commissioning of Lead-acid batteries is very 
important as it determines the behavior and life of the 
batteries. 
Batteries should be given "deep" rejuvenating discharges 
at every outage and batteries that are out of 
specification should be "cycled". 
The use of a gas bubbler system on the batteries to ensure 
full charge should be considered:- the agitation of the 
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electrolyte should eliminate electrolyte stratification 
and the resulting false Specific Gravity measurements. 
6.1.4 Battery Chargers and Inverters 
Large Electrolytic and Oil filled capacitors should be 
replaced every 4 to 6 years as these are the most 
significant cause for equipment failure. 
A temperature survey of Chargers and Inverters should be 
performed as overheating has been identified as the major 
contributor to aging failures. The addition of forced 
cooling may be required. 
Immediate detection of battery charger failure is required 
as the battery will be discharged by ·the time the low 
board voltage alarm is activated. Furthermore, an 
automatic trip of the entire de board is necessary once 
the voltage drops below the board minimum:- this is to 
eliminate spurious control relay operation at low 
voltages. Spurious, unpredictable operation is worse than 
no automatic control at all. 
Periodic testing and Condition monitoring of Battery 
Chargers and Inverters is necessary. The documentation of 
failure causes is necessary to establish areas needing 
improvement. Temperature monitoring of key components for 
overheating is a good indicator of impending failure. Fuse 
failures should be documented: - the manufacturer of the 
fuses should be included in the records so that any 
correlation can be identified. 
Operating and maintenance procedures for the Vital 
Instrumentation & Control Power supplies should be 
improved to reduce the large proportion of failures 
attributed to human error. 
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6.2 Actions for Power plants being designed. 
Simple design changes can have a marked effect on the 
lifetime performance of a Nuclear Power Plant-. These 
changes are most easily effected at the design stage. 
The recommendations based on the contents of this thesis 
for the design of various equipment are:-
6.2.1 Station Blackout 
The design process for modern Nuclear Power Stations 
usually involves a Probabilistic Risk study. This study 
should address the Station Blackout event. One method to 
reduce the impact of Station Blackout is to use Steam to 
power Engineered Safety Feature equipment:- thus the power 
sources are diversified which leads to independence and a 
lower risk of Common Mode failure. Another method to 
reduce the impact of Station Blackout is to have more 
redundant power sources: - use four diesel generators or 
extra battery banks. The Probabilistic Risk study will 
dictate the exact combinations of equipment that meet the 
Licensing Authorities requirements. 
6.2.2 Diesel Generators 
The historical failure modes of Diesel Generators should 
be examined closely and the design changed accordingly. 
The engine governor is the main cause of diesel generator 
failure and the design of this item should be improved. 




The life of Lead-acid batteries can be extended by keeping 
the battery room temperature below 25 deg.C .and by 
ensuring that well filtered battery chargers and inverters 
are used. Furthermore, an air bubbler system which 
agitates the electrolyte will eliminate electrolyte 
stratification and assure full charge of the cells. 
The initial commissioning df Lead-acid batteries is very 
important as it determines the behavior and life of the 
batteries. Therefore when the new plant is commissioned, 
the batteries must not be neglected:- the commissioning 
and maintenance procedures should be in place to control 
the work. 
Diversification of battery types should lead to system 
reliability improvements as each type has different 
failure modes and frequencies. Thus Nickel Cadmium cells 
could be used in one Safety train while Lead-acid cells 
are used in the other. 
6.2.3 Battery Chargers and Inverters 
The design of battery chargers should call for fewer 
Electrolytic and Oil filled Capacitors. Pulse width 
modulation techniques could be used in the inverters or 
battery chargers to eliminate the need for large filtering 
capacitors. Where a large filtering capacitor bank is 
used, each capacitor should be individually fused and 
alarmed:- the failure of a capacitor will not trip the 
Inverter, but the operators will be aware that the 
inverter needs maintenance. Surge suppression equipment is 
recommended on the inputs to Chargers and Inverters. 
Natural cooling should not be used in this equipment as 
aging is accelerated by high temperatures. The 
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qualification specification should call for the 
temperatures of all major components to be measured under 
operating conditions:- this provides the reference values 
for Condition based maintenance of the equipment. 
During construction and commissioning, care should be 
taken to ensure that Chargers and Inverters are not 
prematurely aged by electrical or physical stresses. 
The operation of the equipment should be kept simple:-
operator error is a significant failure mode for Chargers 
and Inverters. 
6.2.4 Vital Instrumentation. & Control Power supplies 
The inverters are the main cause of Vital Instrumentation 
& Control power supply failures: - this is understandable 
as they are complex items of plant. The West German 
approach which eliminates the need for inverters is 
therefore attractive. Their approach is to power the Vital 
Instrumentation & Control equipment with 24 de. The 
overall power supply system is therefore simpler and a 
reduction in operator error can be expected. Operator 
error is the second highest cause of Vital Instrumentation 
& Control Power supply failure. 
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To conclude, the standard PWR Nuclear Power Plant designed 
in 1970 utilized a dual Safety train concept. With the 
increased use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis, the.Station 
Blackout Scenario became a significant Safety concern for 
these plants. 
Several responses to reduce the impact of Station Blackout 
were implemented, and essentially took the form of extra 
power sources such as diesei, steam-turbine or gas-turbine 
generators, or an increase .in the number of redundant 
Safety trains for the newer designs. 
The specific 
equipment is 
combinations of additional or modified 
dictated by. the Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments, and is specific to each plant configuration. 
The loss of all alternating current power sources is not 
the only important electrical accident, the direct current 
systems are also vital to plant reliability. 
Lead-acid batteries are used to provide direct current 
power: - new cell designs are qualified more stringently, 
especially for Seismic withstand capability. Direct 
current equipment failure mode history allows new 
equipment to be designed to be more reliable, and guides 
the application of Condition Based maintenance. 
Finally the significant contribution that Human Error 
makes to equipment and system failure should lead to 
designs that are more user-friendly, and should reduce 
this source of plant unreliability. 
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A. APPENDIX A "A Summary of 10CFR50 For Electrical 
Engineers" 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission of America lays down the 
requirements for Nuclear Power Plants in the United States 
of America and the details of the licensing procedure and 
license requirements are published in the American Code of 
Federal Regulations Title 10 "Energy" Part 50 
"Domestic licensing of production and utilization 
facilities". [ 103 J (The short form reads 10CFR50.) As the 
document is a legal one, it has many parts and spells out 
the requirements in precise terms. As an electrical 
designer, many sections of 10CFR50 are of no immediate 










"General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 
Plants" 
A.1 Technical Information 
The form and content of the technical part of the license 
application are laid down in lOCFR50.34 "Contents of 
Applications; technical information". The applicant must 
submit a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report before the 
Construction permit can be issued and a Final Safety 
Analysis Report before the Operating License can be 
issued. 
103. "COOE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Chapter 10, ENERGY", Published by the Office of the Federal 
Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, United 
States of America, January 1981. 
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A.1.1 The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report 
As the name implies, the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report must present all information necessary for the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be able to ascertain the 
impact of the plant on public health and the environment. 
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report must therefore have 
a description of the proposed site of the Nuclear Power 
Plant and an appraisal of the site in terms of the site 
evaluation factors laid . down in lOCFRlOO "Reactor site 
criteria". Briefly, these factors are:- the 
characteristics of the reactor design, such as the 
quantity of radio-active material, the design standards, 
and the safety features provided to limit the release of 
radio-active material; the population density around the 
reactor site; and the physical characteristics of the 
site, such as the seismic stability of the area. 
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report must also contain a 
summary description of the design and operating features 
of the proposed power plant, and the preliminary design of 
the power plant. The preliminary design must contain the 
design bases of the plant and, to ensure a common 
framework, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission provide their 
minimum design requirements in Appendix A of 10CFR50 
"General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." The 
materials, general arrangement and approximate dimensions 
are also included so that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission can ascertain whether the final plant conforms 
to the original design bases. 
A major portion of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report 
concerns the performance of the structures, systems and 
components of the power plant in terms of the safety of 
the public:- the analysis should detail the safety margins 
during normal and transient operation; the adequacy of the 
safety related structures, systems, and components; and 
the functioning of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems 
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during all credible loss-of-coolant accidents. Any plant 
conditions or variables that are likely to be important 
parts of the plant's specifications should be identified 
at this stage so that these parameters can be verified 
before the operating license is issued. Furthermore, the 
ap~licant's preliminary emergency plans should be 
detailed:- the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 
recommendations are contained in Appendix E of 10CFR50 
"Emergency planning and preparedness for production and 
utilization facilities." 
. 
Further points that should be included in the Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report are:- the proposed organization and 
training of the power p~ant staff and the technical 
qualification of the license applicant to build and 
operate the proposed power plant. Where more than one 
plant is to built on one site, the license applicant must 
give details of how the continued safe operation of the 
operating units will be maintained during the construction 
of further uni ts. Also required is information about the 
proposed Quality Assurance Program to be applied to the 
design, manufacture and construction of the power plant. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's requirements in this 
respect are laid down in Appendix B of 10CFR50 "Quality 
Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel 
Reprocessing Plants." 
Finally, the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report should 
contain information regarding any Research and Development 
work needed to establish the safe functioning of any 
component, structure or system. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission will not issue an operating license unless it 
is satisfied that all safety issues are resolved. 
Thus, the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report contains all 
the information required by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission so that it can determine whether or not the 
proposed plant will significantly affect the safety and 
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health of the public. Once the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission is satisfied that the proposed plant is safe, a 
Construction permit is issued. 
A.1.2 The Final Safety Analysis Report 
When the plant is built, or nearly complete, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission requires a Final Safety Analysis 
Report to be submitted whlch will be used to finally 
determine the overall safety of the Nuclear Power Plant. 
The Final Safety Analysis Report essentially contains the 
same information as the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report, but in greater detail and with the plant as-built 
information. 
Thus the Final Safety Analysis Report contains all the 
plant siting information and shows that the plant conforms 
to all the relevant site evaluation factors. The plant is 
described and analyzed in detail complete with the design 
bases, the justification for the bases, and evaluations 
showing the successful operation of the various safety 
functions. In particular and in relation to the electrical 
design, 10CFR50.34(b) calls for discussions involving the 
instrumentation & control systems, the electrical systems, 
and power conversion schemes where any of these affect the 
plant safety. 
The final quantities and nature of radio-active material 
in the plant is listed, and the manner in which the 
release of radio-active material is controlled and limited 
is also given. The amount of radiation the plant operators 
and the public will be exposed to is also dealt with 
here:- the limits are set out in lOCFR20 "Standards for 
protection against radiation." 
Again, the major portion of the Final Safety Analysis 
Report concerns the effect of the plant on the public 
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health and the environment:- and so, much attention is 
paid to the analysis and evaluation of the design and 
performance of the plant systems, structures and 
components - particularly those associated with the safe 
shut-down of the reactor and the containment of radio-
activity. The Emergency Core Cooling Systems are analyzed 
and evaluated for all postulated Loss of Coolant Accidents 
(LOCA's), and where any Research and Development was 
required to verify the performance of safety related 
equipment, the results are glven now. 
The Final Safety Analysis Report must also present details 
of the organizational structure, the technical 
qualifications of the license applicant, and the details 
of the Operator re-qualification program:- the guide-lines 
for Operator re-qualification are contained in 10CFR55 
"Operator's licenses" Appendix A "Requalification programs 
for Licensed operators of Production and Utilization 
Facilities." The continued training of Nuclear plant 
operators is important as this minimizes the possibility 
of operator error in an accident situation. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission requires details of the 
administrative controls to be used to assure the safe 
operation of the plant and the requirements in this regard 
are laid down in Appendix B of lOCFRSO "Quality Assurance 
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing 
Plants." 
In addition to the administrative controls, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission require plans for pre-operational 
testing and initial operation of the new equipment. 
Furthermore, plans for normal operation, surveillance, 
maintenance and periodic testing as well as plans for 
emergencies (as set out in Appendix E of 10CFR50), are 
required. The operating technical specifications as 
described in lOCFRS0.36 are required as part of the 
license: - if any of the specified criteria are violated 
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then various actions are laid down, the most stringent 
being to immediately shut the reactor down completely. 
Finally, as in the Preliminary Safety Analysis ·Report, 
where more than one plant is to built on one site, the 
license applicant must give full details of how the 
continued safe operation of the operating uni ts will be 
maintained during the construction of further units. 
A.1.3 The Physical Security·Plan 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission require a satisfactory 
Physical Security Plan in addition to the Final Safety 
Analysis Report before an Operating license can be issued. 
The main purpose of the Physical Security Plan is to 
prevent sabotaging of the Nuclear reactor or theft of 
radio-active material. 
A.1.4 The Safeguards Contingency Plan 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also require a 
Safeguards Contingency Plan:-this is a documented plan 
with specific responses to various physical security 
breaches. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements 
for the Physical Security Plan and the Safeguards 
Contingency Plan are laid down in 10CFR73 "Physical 
protection of Plants and Materials." 
Thus the Final Safety Analysis Report in conjunction with 
the Physical Security Plan and the Safeguards Contingency 
Plan contains sufficient information to allow the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to finally ascertain the safety of 
the new Nuclear Power Plant. If the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission is satisfied with all facets of the power 
station design, construction, commissioning and 
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operational structure, an Operating License will be 
issued. 
A. 2 General Design Criteria 
Appendix A "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 
Plants" of 10CFR50 contains the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's requirements for the design of Nuclear power 
generating stations. I shali discuss those General Design 
Criteria applicable, to electrical design in some detail, 
and pass over the other criteria with a short summary. 
Appendix A of 10CFR50 contains fifty-five General Design 
Criteria. 
The first five General Design Criteria are overall 
requirements and lay down conditions for:- Quality 
Control; protection against natural phenomena 
(earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunami, etc.); fire protection; 
protection against accident phenomena (the effects of 
postulated accidents such as Loss of Coolant Accidents, 
missiles from the turbines and pipe-whip effects); and for 
the sharing of structures, systems and components between 
Units at multiple Unit sites. 
The following ten General Design Criteria give the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's guidelines for the prevention of 
radio-active release by utilizing multiple Fission Product 
Barriers. Hence the General Design Criteria give 
requirements for:- the reactor design and operational 
characteristics; the instrumentation and control equipment 
used to keep the reactor in a safe operating condition; 
the design of the Containment structure; the design, 
inspection and testing of the Electric power supplies; 
and for the Unit Control Rooms. 
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The rest of lOCFRSO Appendix A has:- ten General Design 
Criteria giving requirements for the reactor protection 
and reactivity control systems; seventeen General Design 
Criteria applicable to the Fluid systems; eight ·General 
Design Criteria applicable to the reactor Containment 
structure; and the final five concern the control of 
Nuclear fuel and radio-active material. 
Now, the General Design Criteria applicable to Electric 
power systems are General Design Criteria 17 and 18. The 
General Design Criterion 17 cails for two main sources of 
electric power:- onsite and offsite. These power sources 
should be designed so that the systems important to safety 
will always be available .. The capacity and configuration 
of these power sources should be such that the Fission 
Product boundaries remain intact during all possible 
operational conditions, and that the reactor core is 
cooled and reactivity contained for all postulated 
accident conditions. 
The batteries and distribution systems of the onsite 
electric power supplies should have sufficient 
independence, redundancy, and testability so that they 
fulfill their safety functions even with a single failure 
occurring. 
The electric power from the offsite transmission network 
should be suppiied by two physically independent circuits 
which are designed and located so as to minimize the 
chances that they will fail simultaneously. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission allow a common switchyard and a 
common right of way for the two independent feeders. 
Again, each of the offsite power sources must be available 
independently of whether the other one fails, or all 
onsite the power sources fail. One of the offsite electric 
power sources should be available in a few seconds 
following a Loss of Coolant Accident to ensure the 
containment of radio-active material. 
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Appendix A draws the designer's attention to the facts 
that neither a generator trip, nor an offsite power loss, 
nor any onsite power losses, shall cause the loss· of any 
of the remaining power supplies. 
General Design Criteria 18 gives the requirements for the 
inspection and testing of the electric power systems. The 
electric power systems important to safety should be 
designed so that periodic inspection and testing of the 
wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards can be 
carried out. The purpose of these inspections and test are 
to ensure that the electric power systems remain as 
reliable as possible. Both .the systems as a whole, and the
parts there-of are tested periodically under conditions 
that mimic the design operating state as closely as 
possible. Examples of system components are relays, 
switches and busbars; and system examples are the reactor 
protection system, and the electric power transfer systems 
between the offsite, onsite and intra-unit power sources 
and sinks. 
A. 3 Plant Technical Specifications 
The third section of 10CFR50 that is important to the 
electrical designer is 10CFR50.36 "Technical 
Specifications". The technical specification of a Nuclear 
Power Station contains the safety limits for those process 
parameters of the plant which, if exceeded, would 
significantly increase the chances of a radio-active 
release occurring. The Operating License therefore has a 
clause that instructs the plant operators to immediately 
shut the reactor down if any safety limit is exceeded and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must sanction the 
continued operation of the plant before the start-up of 
the plant. 
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The technical specification also contains limiting safety 
system settings for the automatic protection systems:-
these are the limits for those variables controlled by the 
automatic protection systems such as the ·Reactor 
Protection System. That is to say, that the automatic 
protection system must never allow the controlled variable 
to exceed the limiting safety system setting for that 
variable. Should an automatic protection system not 
function as required during normal operation, then the 
technical specification .requires appropriate action or 
even reactor shut-down. The purpose of the limiting safety 
system setting is to prevent a safety limit being 
exceeded. This is a serious condition requiring much 
investigation before the plant can operate again. A 
transgression of a limiting safety system setting, 
however, is resolved by the plant operator and he decides 
when to start up the plant again. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission nevertheless requires all information about the 
incident and the justification for plant re-start. 
The plant specification contains the limiting conditions 
for operation:- these are the minimum functional or 
performance levels that can be tolerated in equipment 
important to safety. Again, the reactor may have to be 
shut down if a limiting condition for operation is 
exceeded. 
Surveillance requirements are included in the plant 
specification:- these are to make sure that the equipment 
important to safety is functioning correctly so that the 
plant does not exceed any safety limits and remains within 
the operational limiting conditions. The surveillance 
requirements apply to testing, calibration and inspection. 
The final part of the technical specifications provide for 
administrative controls such as procedures and 
recordkeeping which are needed to operate the plant 
safely. 
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